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This thesis examines Cuban involvement in Angola and
Ethiopia in light of Cuba's foreign policy and Cuban-Soviet
relations. Utilizing the two case studies, it analyzes the
degree to which Cuban activities in Africa were Soviet-
directed or Soviet-sponsored. The conclusion is that Cuba
exhibited substantial relative autonomy in Angola, but limited
autonomy in Ethiopia. That conclusion is applied to Cuba in
the 1990's, in which the current wave of democracy spreading
throughout Easterk, Europe and the improved relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States have resulted in
increased pressures on Cuba's foreign and domestic policies.
Four scenarios are posited for Cuba's future. Finally, the
thesis discusses whether the levels of autonomy attained in
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Cuba has always had its own foreign policy agenda. In
November 1975, Cuba deployed thousands of combat troops to
Angola in support of a request by the leader of the Popular
Movement fcr the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Critics believe
that this was a radical departure in Cuban foreign policy.
They believe that the primary reasons President Fidel Castro
sent troops to Angola were first, because Moscow told Castro
he should; and second, because the Cuban deployment of troops
would serve as a means of reducing Cuba's large debt to the
Soviet Union. However, the literature' and history that has
been written on Cuba's foreign policy and its involvement in
Africa does not support these two assumptions very
'Some of the key works that discuss Cuba's foreign policy
and its involvement in Angola and Africa include: William M.
LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980, Policy Papers
in International Affairs Number 13 (Berkley: Institute of
International Studies, 1980); William J. Durch, The Cuban
Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to
Angola, Professional Paper Number 201 (Arlington, Virginia:
The Center for Naval Analysis, September 1977); John Marcum,
The Angolan Warfare, 1962-1976, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 1978); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study
of Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, Inc., 1980); Colin Legum and Bill Lee, eds.,
The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis (New York: Africana
Publishing Company, 1979); Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban
Alliance in Africa and the Caribbean," The World Today 34, no.
2 (February 1981): pp. 45-53; and Jiri Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban
Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons,"
Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 2 (Fall/Winter
1980/81): pp. 353-367.
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effectively. Cuba's involvement in Africa neither began in
Angola nor did it end there. Rather Africa in many ways, met
Cuba's foreign policy objectives most eloquently.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Cuban-Soviet
relationship with reference to Cuba's foreign policy
initiatives and its involveme~it in the conflicts in Angola and
Ethiopia. It will define the surrogacy and autonomy theories
and it will discuss the problem with the surrogacy theory and
attempt to apply the autonomy concept to these two conflicts.
The thesis will try to determine how much autonomy a Third
World nation must achieve in order not to be considered a
surrogate. Using Cuba and the Soviet Union with Angola and
Ethiopia as case studies, the primary questions to be answered
in this thesis are: 1) Is Cuba a surrogate of the Soviet
Union?; 2) Was Cuba acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union
or was it autonomous in the cases of Angola and Ethiopia?; and
3) What might relations be like for Cuba and the Soviet Union
in the future and what are the its implications of those
relations for Cuba's autonomy in the future?
2
A. WHAT IS SURROGACY/PROXY? 2
Surrogate or proxy is defined as one entity that is
authorized to act in the place of another, a substitute.
Surrogacy is closely related to a country's foreign policy and
to the amount of influence that one country possesses over
another country's foreign policy decision making process. For
the purpose of this paper influence will be defined as a
bilateral state-to-state relationship, with the dominant
country having the capacity to sway or control the other
country's political decisions and to produce an effect on its
foreign policy decisions. 3 Thus, if a country has the ability
to influence another country's foL+eign policy, then the latter
will be considered a surrogate of the former. In the case of
2The following definitions of surrogacy, influence,
dependency, and autonomy have been derived from readings on
the subject, (i.e. Gary Gereffi and Peter Evans, "Transitional
Corporations, Dependent Development, and State Policy on the
Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico," Latin
America's Economic Development Institutionalist and
Structuralist Perspectives, eds., James L. Dietz and James H.
Street (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); Marina
Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); Denise L. Bark ed., The
Red Orchestra, The Case of Africa vol. 2 (Stanford University,
California: Hoover Institute, 1988); Carmelo-Mesa Lago and
June S. Belk eds., Cuba in Africa (University of Pittsburgh:
Center for Latin American Studies, University Center for
International Studies, 1982); William M. LeoGrande, Cuba's
Policy in Africa; and Robert A. Pastor, "Does Cuba Act Alone, "
The Cuba Reader eds., Paul Brenner, William M. LeoGrande,
Donna Rich, Daniel Siegel (New York: Grove Presn, 1989), pp.
296-307).
30Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence, pp. 10-11.
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Cuba and the Soviet Union, this paper will attempt to
illustrate that Cuba has always possessed its own foreign
policy agenda even if the Soviet Union has, on occasion,
influenced Cuba's foreign policy decisions (i.e.
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979).
An important question to ask is, if a country is
considered a eurrogate once, then is it always considered a
surrogate? The answer to this is no. Relationships are
dynamic and in one situation two countries may be in agreement
while in another situation they may be distinctively
different. This thesis will illustrate how the Soviet Union
supported Cuba's military solution to the situation in Angola.
On the other hand, in Ethiopia, Cuba pushed for a diplomatic
solution, while both the Soviet Union and Ethiopia pushed for
a military solution. The end result was Cuba assisting
Ethiopia with a military solution even though this was not the
means that Cuba desired to pursue.
It is useful at this juncture to also define dependency.
Dependency refers to one entity being unable to exist or
function satisfactorily without the aid or support of another.
Dependency, as opposed to surrogacy, is closely related in
terms of a country's domestic policy (economic, political, and
military). Gary Gereffi and Peter Evans state that
Dependency and nondependency are relative concepts that
must be interpreted in the context of a country's overall
position in the capitalist world economy. Dependency
implies vulnerability to the external economy and a
significant degree of external control over the local
4
productive apparatus. Nondependency, on the other hand,
means diminished external determination of a country's
development. It means having an internal productive
structure that is capable of producing a broad range of
goods and that also is locally owned and controlled to a
substantial degree, especially the "leading sectors" in
terms of capital accumulation and sectors where
considerable market power is exercised by the major
firms.'
A superpower who supplies a country with economic and
military aid does not necessarily buy the right to wield
coercive influence over that country's foreign or domestic
policy. However, the aid that is provided may have a
significant impact on the capabilities of the country. In the
case of Cuba, without Soviet assistance in the early 1970's in
building up and training the Cuban Armed Forces, they may not
have been able to assist the MPLA in Angola as successfully as
they did. Thus, on the basis of the conceptual description
presented thus far in this thesis, the following assumptions
can be made: Cuba has been influenced by the Soviet Union and
has, on occasion, played the surrogate role for the Soviet
Union; Cuba is irrefutably dependent on the Soviet Union to
function satisfactorily domestically; and, the Soviet Union's
aid to Cuba has influenced Cuba's capability to involve itself
abroad. The question then is, "can a surrogate country ever
achieve autonomy?"
4Gereffi and Evans, "Transnational Corporations," p. 184.
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B. WELT IS AUTONOMY?
Autonomy shall be defined for the purpose of this paper as
independent, self-contained or self-governing. It can be
reasonably stated that complete autonomy does not exist, thus
making autonomy relative in concept. Despite this, when
discussing autonomy and a superpower, such as the United
States, there is an overall perception that the U.S. is
relatively autonomous. Does this apply to a Third World
nation? Does a Third World nation's dependency on another
country prevent it from achieving relative autonomy even if it
has once acted as a surrogate? If autonomy is relative then
what things are necessary for any country to achieve some
level of autonomy?
There seems to be three requirements for achieving
autonomy. First, a country must have its own foreign policy
initiatives. Second, a country must be able, with or without
assistance, to set in place these foreign policy initiatives
and attempt to achieve their objectives. However, success is
not a requirement of the end result. Third, in carrying out
its foreign policy, a country must be recognized as having a
legitimate position in the international arena. Furthermore,
the more situations in which a country exerts its own foreign
policy initiatives the more autonomy the country will be
perceived as possessing, thus making autonomy not only
relative but also perceptual or "context-specific" in concept.
Thus, a country can, in effect, "manufacture" more autonomy
6
for itself. As soon as a country supports or participates in
a situation that is globally viewed as not being in line with
its own foreign policy but rather as a surrogate to some other
country, then, it will be recognized as not possessing the
same levels of autonomy for that situation.
Given that autonomy is relative and context-specific it
can be applied to each situation in which a country
participates. For superpowers with seemingly unlimited
capabilities, monies, and resources, autonomy is easy and
rarely questioned. For example, in the 1990 Persian Gulf
crisis American objectives include preventing Iraq's further
expansion in the region and forcing it out of Kuwait. The
means to these ends entail a complete air and sea embargo. By
late 1990, the United States has been partially successful but
not without the assistance of many nations. When a superpower
requires the assistance of another country or countries to
achieve its foreign policy objectives, its autonomy is seldom
questioned. On the other hand, when a Third World nation
requires external assistance its autonomy is scrutinized.
Thus a Third World nation can reach a level of autonomy in one
situation and be perceived as a surrogate possessing little or
no autonomy in another.
C. CUBA'S PRIMARY FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
When a Third World nation aligns itself with a superpower,
it is usually in its own best interest to support the foreign
7
policy initiatives set forth by the superpower. This
alignment may occur as a result of a convergence of interests
or ideologies. However, a Third World nation's foreign policy
initiatives will not always converge with those of the
superpower in every situation. Whether or not the Third World
country can carry out its independent initiatives during these
periods will determine whether the country possesses more or
less autonomy. During periods when foreign policy initiatives
do converge, labels such as "surrogate," "proxy," and "puppet"
are quickly attached to these Third World nations; especially
to those Third World countries that are most closely aligned
in interest and in ideology.
One of the main drawbacks to "labelling" is that it may
well obscure rather than clarify the degree of "autonomy" a
nation possesses. Indeed labels make it very difficult to
determine a Third World countrys' independence or autonomy.
The Cuban case is particularly instructive: it has been
struggling with this problem since before independence.
First, it was a colony of Spain (1513-1902), then a
protectorate of the United States (1902-1962), and finally
economically reliant on the Soviet Union (1962-to the
present).
Pamela Falk writes that "...[I]t is not unusual for a
developing nation, newly independent, to establish a bold and
assertive foreign policy to compensate for domestic
8
frustrations and internal failures."5  Cuba is an excellent
example. As early as 1898, when the country gained its
independence from Spain, Cuba pursued a bold and assertive
foreign policy. Cuba's primary objectives in developing its
foreign policy were to establish not only national autonomy
but also to gain international recognition. These objectives
have remained constant from the late nineteenth century
through the Cuban revolution and into the present day.
During the early 1970's, Cuba underwent a massive
restructuring and build-up of its armed forces with critical
assistance provided by the Soviet Union. As a result of this
enlarged military, a new foreign policy objective was included
in its agenda: Cuba's expansion of influence to the rest of
the Third World. Thus, by the mid-1970's, Cuba possessed a
very bold and assertive foreign policy with its three primary
objectives being 1) to establish national autonomy; 2) to gain
international recognition; and 3) to expand its influence
throughout the rest of the Third World.
Allied with the United States, Cuba found itself being
directed with a heavy hand in both its foreign and domestic
policy objectives. Allied with the Soviet Union, Cuba has
been able to develop relatively successful foreign policy
initiatives in Africa and in Central America. Consequently,
this thesis will illustrate how Cuba has managed to achieve
8 Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 4.
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greater autonomy in its foreign policy the past twenty-eight
years aligned with the Soviet Union than they were ever able
to accomplish in the previous 57 years allied with the United
States.
Nevertheless, Cuba's foreign policy success coupled with
its economic reliance on the Soviet Union continues to be the
primary factor behind its label as a surrogate or proxy of the
Soviet Union.
The following sections of this thesis will be divided
accordingly: chapter two presents an historical overview
tracing Cuba's foreign policy from the pre-Castro era to the
present. Chapter three discusses the developing relationship
between Cuba and the Soviet Union and the value Cuba has to
the Soviet Union. Chapter four assesses Cuban and Soviet
interests in Africa. In the Cuba portion of this chapter it
discusses Cuba's involvement in Africa and the role Ernesto
"Che" Guevara played in the development of Cuban-African
relations. Chapters five and six discuss Cuba's involvement
in Angola and Ethiopia. They also assess the results of Cuban
involvement and Soviet military aid in these two countries.
Chapter seven compares Cuba's role in Angola and Ethiopia and
answers the primary questions outlined in the introduction.
Based on this analysis, the conclusion, chapter eight,
discusses four possible scenarios Castro may face in the
future. It outlines Castro's primary concerns in order to
maintain his leadership position and most importantly what
10
effect it will have for future Cuban-Soviet relations.
Finally, it suggests which of the scenarios are most likely to
occur and how this could affect the prospects for future
autonomy in Cuba's foreign policy.
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I1. HISTORICAL OVZRVIZW
A. FOZRIGN POLICY PRIOR TO CUBAN REVOLUTION
Cuban foreign/domestic policy from independence until
World War II met with relatively small gains and high
frustrations as a result of U.S. hegemony over the region.
Early on, during its struggle for independence, Cuba
learned that "international recognition would be the key to
international leverage."6 Cuba's first attempt at foreign
policy was established while it was trying to gain its
independence from Spain by broadening diplomatic contacts.
Cuban independence leaders were quite successful at this task.
Support for Cuban independence and national autonomy was not
just regional by countries such as Venezuela, Mexico, and
Colombia; it was also global. Besides the United States,
countries such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and
Italy also supported Cuba's goal for autonomy.
However, Cuba found out that independence with the help of
their northern neighbors had its price. In Cuba's struggle
for independence, Cuban revolutionaries enlisted the aid of
the United States. The United States entered the Cuban war
for independence only after the following incident:
"lFalk., p. 5.
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After the Cubans had staged their second rebellion against
Spain in 1895, President McKinley sent the U.S. battleship
Maine down to Havana in order to protect U.S. citizens and
property. The ship suffered a severe explosion and sunk.
The United States accused Spain for this incident and
consequently allied with Cuba and proclaimed war against
Spain."
The Spanish-American War lasted four years. In December 1898,
the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris which
granted independence to Cuba.8  Although the war was over,
Cuba gained independence but did not obtain national autonomy.
This was a result of the United States occupying the country
for the four years after independence.
1. Cuba's Foreign Policy Under The Platt Amendment
The Platt Amendment of 1901 made Cuba a protectorate
of the United States. The amendment became a U.S. law, and
was adopted by Cuban legislature to become an annex to the
Cuban Constitution.9 Basically, this amendment allowed the
United States to intervene militarily in Cuban affairs
whenever the U.S. deemed necessary.
7 lbid., pp. 7-18; Roger W. Fountain, On Negotiating with
Cuba (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 7.
@This treaty is also noteworthy in that it awarded the
United States with other Spanish territories such as Puerto
Rico as war booty.
*Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba, From Columbus to Castro (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 97.
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Despite this amendment, Cuba's first elected
president, Tomas Estrada-Palma, viewed foreign policy as the
key to international prestige. Thus he set out to make
foreign policy his first order of business, as did the
majority of his predecessors. "Estrada-Palma, eager to create
the fact and appearance of a new independent republic,
encouraged the Cuban Congress to increase expenditures on the
national budget to assume the cost of domestic defense," °
and quickly enlarged Cuba's armed forces.
This increase in forces also served the best interests
of the United States. Cuba's importance to the U.S. was
three-fold. First, it stemmed primarily from its proximity to
the sea lanes of the Caribbean which provided access routes to
trade with Latin America. Second, Cuban sugar production
provided the United States and Western Europe with their sugar
supply. Finally, the construction of the Panama Canal
heightened Cuba's strategic value to the United States. 1" In
military terms, Cuba would serve as the "watchdog" of the
Caribbean. Thus the United States hoped that Estrada-Palma's
military build-up would provide Cuban soldiers to defend U.S.
interests in the Caribbean.
Although the Cuban econory flourished, as a direct
result of increased U.S. investment, domestic corruption
10Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 8.
"Ibid., pp. 8-9; Fountain, Negotiating with Cuba, p. 7.
14
undermined the administration of Estrada-Palma. This
corruption bred resentment which the government met with
repression. Consequently in 1906, under the authority of the
Platt Amendment, the United States intervened in Cuba's
domestic affairs. The first Cuban presidency thus ended in
failure and the Unites States occupied Cuba once again.
During the second U.S. occupation, "Cuba had virtually
no independence in foreign policy making."' 12  Despite U.S.
intervention and attempts to settle differences
diplomatically, the government remained disorderly. 13 As a
result, Theodore Roosevelt declared that by the end of his
term U.S. intervention would cease and Cuba would be ruled by
its own elected leaders.
2. foreign Policy During World War I
Cuba was under great pressure to support the United
States in World War I. While most of Latin America was
divided over what position to take, "...Cuba favored a
declaration of war for two reasons: first, Cuba [would be]
able to exert its leadership role, and second, Cuba's economy
[would] clearly [benefit] from the sale of sugar to the United
States." 14
12 7alk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 9.
"23Suchlicki, Columbus to Castro, p. 21.
"
14Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 10.
15
World War I provided Cuba with its second major
foreign policy initiative since diplomatic contacts were
established during the struggle for independence. Instead of
soldiers, Cuba's first technical assistance abroad supplied
France with approximately one hundred doctors and medical
personnel."
In spite of U.S. pressure and intervention, by the
1930's Cuba had established itself as a regional negotiator.
Consequently, confronted with Cuba's increased role in South
America, U.S. policy shifted. In 1934, the Roosevelt
administration prompted Congress to rescind the Platt
Amendment, thus providing concrete expression to the
President's "Good Neighbor Policy."
3. roreign Policy During World War I1
After Roosevelt's abrogation of the Platt Amendment,
Cuba experienced very little direct U.S. intervention.
Nonetheless, during this time, Cuba's foreign policy was
structured by strong bilateral economic and military
cooperation with the United States. During World War II,
Cuba's markets to Europe were cut off, and Cuba began to rely
economically and politically on the United States. The United
States had large investments in Cuba's sugar, tobacco, cattle
ranching, mining, manufacturing, public utilities, and banking
"Harold Eugene Davis, John J. Fiman, and F. Taylor Peck,
ode., Latin American Diplomatic History (Baton Rouge, La.:
Louisiana State University Press, 1977), p. 193.
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industries. Eighty percent of Cuba's imports came from the
United States.1 6
Although President Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar
initially vowed a policy of neutrality in World War II, the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drastically changed his
policy. Cuba not only declared war on Japan, but also
declared war on Germany and Italy. During this period, Cuba
also established its first diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union.
World War II provided Cuba the international
recognition for which it had been striving since independence.
The war resulted in positive effects on Cuban foreign policy
objectives and on the Cuban economy, because of wartime sugar
sales.
However, as the cold war began to dominate the
hemispheric politics after WWII, tensions between Cuba and the
United States mounted. Cuba also began to face internal
political problems as three opposition parties were
established, increasing tensions with the United States even
further. Fulgencio Batista became president for a second
time. The cold war brought significant changes to Cuba; the
threat of communism and the decline in world sugar prices
"
1Suchlicki, Columbus to Castro, p. 22.
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brought about economic hard times. Batista used these
conditions as an excuse for a repressive internal rule.'"
Batista terminated foreign policy initiatives that
would include alliances with reform movements in Latin America
and Europe."' While the opposition to Batista pleaded for
the United States, the Organization of American States (OAS)
and the United Nations to intervene, no direct intervention
occurred. Indeed, until 1958, foreign policy in Cuba was
Batista's alone. The revolution would sharply re-order Cuban
foreign policy objectives and alignments.
"17Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 18.
"ZIbid.
18
111. RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION
A. CUBA' S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES UNDER CASTRO
Since independence, the American predominance over the
region created stressful relations with Cuba. The Cuban
revolution was the major watershed for U.S.-Cuban relations.
Castro initially intended, to utilize "democracy" as a tool to
promote his revolution. However, the United States'
persistent intervention during the early part of Castro's rule
forced him to reveal his penchant for authoritarianism.
Castro did not foresee the shape of his future government
while he was fighting in the Sierra Maestra mountains; nor did
he understand the role the United States would play. "Fidel
naively believed that the rebels could make a radical social
revolution democratically. Since his basic aim was
revolution, and democracy was simply the method he thought he
could use, when the crunch came he changed his method, not his
goal."1 9 Thus, Fidel broke with the democratic process and
pursued a Marxist-Leninist line in his revolution.2" Within
the first eighteen months he suspended the Army, the Navy, and
"Andrew Sinclair, Che Guevara (New York: The Viking
Press, 1970), p. 51.
"
2While Castro and the other rebels were fighting, he was
heavily influenced by Ernesto "Che" Guevara on Marxist-
Leninism. In many ways Che was instrumental in Castro's
conversion to communism.
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the National Police Force and developed a more centralized
government. He implemented this centralized government by
filling high-ranking positions with those individuals who had
fought with him in the revolution. In 1959, the United States
tried unsuccessfully to utilize its influence over Cuba as the
U.S. opposed the leftist government Castro had begun to set in
motion. By April 1961, Castro declared Cuba a socialist
country.
B. TEE ZARLY 19601S
Cautiously, the Soviet Union became committed to Cuba and
by 1962 the Soviet Union recognized Cuba as such. During the
1960' s, Cuban-Soviet relations depended heavily on maintaining
economic and military relations. This new alliance came at a
great cost for the Soviet Union. The initial Soviet economic
aid package provided a $100 million U.S. dollars credit line
to purchase Soviet industrial equipment and the Soviets agreed
to purchase 425,000 tons of Cuban sugar. 21  In 1989, Cuba
received between four and six billion dollars annually from
Moscow, with additional aid programs accounting for as much as
twenty percent of the Cuban Gross National Product (GNP).22
"
21H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations, The
Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1985), p. 17.
22Howard W. French, "Write Off Castro? The Odds Change,"
The New York Times, 13 May 1990, p. 2E; Larry Rohter, "Castro
Says He'll Resist Changes Like Those Sweeping Soviet Bloc,"
The New York Times, 9 December 1989, p. 9A; Joseph B.
20
Cuban foreign policy during this adjustment period was
primarily regional rather than global." The focus of policy
was in the Western Hemisphere, "...where Cuba sought to break
diplomatic and economic isolation imposed by the United States
by promoting revolutions throughout the region. ,24
Initially the Soviet Union was skeptical about Cuba's
style of radical, anti-Americanism and its revolutionary
capacity, but with time the Soviets grew increasingly more
interested. The long standing concept of "geographic
fatalism"25 soon disappeared as relations between Cuba and the
Soviet Union developed. By allying themselves with Cuba, the
Soviets gained access to the Western Hemisphere. They were
able to capitalize on Cuba's strategic value against the
Treaster, "Other Walls May Fall, But In Fortress Cuba Castro
Stands Firm," The New York Times, 28 January 1990, p. 2E; and
Michael Putzel, "Castro to Welcome Gorbachev Today," The
Monterey Herald, 2 April 1989, p. 4A.
"23In the early 1960's, Cuba was able to provide some
support for its revolutionary cause abroad to Africa. This
assistance, however, was minimal until the early 1970's. The
faction receiving the foremost assistance was the Movimiento
Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) which is discussed
later in chapter V.
24LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 1.
"The Soviet Union's approach prior to the 1960's has been
characterized by Joseph G. Whelan and Michael J. Dixon as
"...that doctrine (which] held that Latin America was largely
off limits to the Soviets because of the United States'
overwhelming influence in the Western Hemisphere and a
consequent lack of Soviet opportunity." Further discussion of
geographic fatalism is described in Joseph G. Whelan and
Michael J. Dixon's The Soviet Union in the Third World: Threat
to World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon Press, 1986), p. 8.
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United States by utilizing foreign posts, military air bases,
and training facilities for ground troops. Additionally,
where Cuba was once considered to be the "watchdog" of the
Caribbean for the United States, installation of Soviet
intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba provided the Soviet
Union with a "strategic backyard" to the U.S.
Despite many ideological and political bonds between Cuba
and the Soviet Union, bilateral relations have been marked by
periodic stress. Indeed their relationship has survived
several critical disputes: during the 1960's, Cuba's refusal
to side with the Soviet's dispute with China; 1962, the Cuban
Missile crisis; 1963, Castro's refusal to sign the Nuclear
Teat Ban Treaty; and 1967, Castro's refusal to support the
Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty. 26
1. The Late 1960's
In the late 1960's, the Vietnam War provided Castro
with the opportunity he needed to secure Cuba's national
security and to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union. A
new radical foreign policy was established with two strategic
objectives:
1. To spark revolution in Latin America, thus ending
Cuba's hemispheric isolation and also easing pressure on
Vietnam because the United States would be forced with
two, three, maybe many Vietnams.
2 6Suchlicki, Columbus to Castro, pp. 149-151; W. Raymond
Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), pp. 40-45.
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2. To form a third force within the socialist camp
composed of Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea to promote
militant socialist solidarity in the face of U.S.
aggression.27
Not only did neither one of its foreign policy initiatives
succeed, but they placed a heavy strain on Soviet-Cuban
relations. Consequently, in early 1968, Soviet petroleum
shipments to Cuba were delayed. Cuban analyst, Jorge I.
Dominguez and others interpreted this delay as politically
motivated. 2' Whatever the motivation of the Brezhnev
administration, the incident served to emphasize the
dependence of the Cuban economy on the Soviet Union.
Consequently, as a means of reconciliation, in August
1968 Castro used the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an
opportunity to improve relations with Moscow. In an
uncharacteristic move, Castro publicly applauded the invasion
despite historical support for the underdog. 2' Castro's
perspective was that if Dubcek was endangering socialism in
Czechoslovakia, as charged by the Soviets, then some sort of
action was justified."0
27LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 6.
2*Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978),
pp. 162-165.
2
'Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1983), pp. 153-154.
2 0LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 7.
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One of the Soviet's initial hesitations with adopting
Cuba as an ally was Cuba's radical approach in its foreign
policy. The Soviets maintained a less violent policy in
support of national liberation movements. In the early 1960's
this difference in approach added to the tensions between Cuba
and the Soviet Union. However, during the latter part of the
1960's, Cuba's foreign policy was overshadowed by heightened
domestic problems. These domestic problems were largely a
result of Cuba's failure to produce the ten million tons of
sugar as agreed with the USSR in 1970. While Cuba's foreign
policy objectives remained unchanged, the specific policies to
achieve its goals became quite different. Given deteriorating
economic conditions in Cuba, as the Soviets adopted a less
confrontational approach, Castro felt compelled to follow.
Consequently tensions between Moscow and Havana began to
decrease.
2. The 1970'S
Thus, by 1970, Cuban-Soviet relations reached a
turning point and improved tremendously. "Cuba's great leap
approach to development had failed, and its subsequent
economic reforms brought Cuba much closer to the Soviet model
of socialist construction, [rather than China] eliminating a




The global transition from cold war to detente heavily
influenced Cuba's foreign policy. While Cuba policy towards
Latin America remained the same, "...the new climate of
detente made conciliation a more viable strategy than
revolution." 32
Internally, the most noticeable change that occurred
in Cuba was the massive restructuring and build-up of Cuban
armed forces with the assistance of the Soviets. The missions
of this improved Cuban armed force were, "to provide
territorial defense, to maintain internal security, and to
provide military aid and/or assistance to selected foreign
countries or groups." 33  Externally, the most significant
change in Cuba's foreign policy was with Cuba's relations not
only within the region but with the rest of the Third World as
well.
Cuba's new foreign policy objective was to expand its
influence in the rest of the Third World. This new objective
was pursued by an expansion of Cuban aid missions, a much more
vocal Cuban role in the Movement of Non-aligned Nations (NAM),
and eventually, the deployment of Cuban combat troops to
Africa. While the 1960's resulted in a decade of internal
3 2Ibid., p. 8. Additionally, Che Guevara's death while
fighting in Bolivia and promoting revolution also waned the
Cubans traditional revolutionary ideology.
"
3Department of Defense Document, Handbook of the Cuban
Armed Forces, 1979, by The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
DDB-2680-62-79, 1979, p. 1-5.
25
consolidation for the Castro Revolution, the 1970's would thus
result in a period of external projection and a transition
from regional actor to global actor. 3'
34Nolf Grabendorff, "Cuba's Involvement in Africa: An
Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions, and Limitations,"
Journal of Interamerican Studies 22, no. 1 (February 1980): p.
8.
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IV. SOVIZET AND CUBAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA
A. WHY AFRICA? A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In the early part of the fifteenth century, the first
exploration of Africa brought the Portuguese to the area of
Senegal, Guinea and to the islands west of Africa. However,
Portuguese colonization occurred only because it was permitted
by the other more aggressive colonial powers, France and Great
Britain. Portugal was allowed to assume control only of those
poor territories that were not already occupied by the French
and the British. Portugal's main African colonies included
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sao Tome Principe, and Guinea-
Bisseau. "By 1939 the European colonial powers were as firmly
in control of their African territories as they ever would
be.... [with] few major challenges to their authority."n3 (See
figure 2 for illustration of the division of colonies by 1940).
The striving for independence began in earnest in Africa
during World War II. By the 1960's Portuguese colonialism in
Africa began to dissipate. More and more, portions of the
economy in Portuguese Africa were being opened to foreign
investment. Much of the African economy beganto be managed
by other external actors such as Belgium, Great Britain, and
"
35Michael Crowder, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa;
From c. 1940 to c. 1975 8 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), p. 8.
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the United States.3  In Angola, the burgeoning oil industry
was the most noticeable segment of the economy attracting
foreign investment.
AL Nv LIBYA
t' \ CH WES AFRICA \ANIGLO-1 f,
WWI EAST Af.I.CA
CA IM Ou ' i 1G
%*.b 16 . 0.t, I, 4V"'
':.AW .... I . ,.
Hisoryof fria, .Af 3.
3 FakCubn oregnPolcy p.84
28OS4
B. AFRICA'S STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL VALUE
Africa possesses viable strategic and political value.
Strategically Africa provides external actors access to naval,
air, and communications facilities. The Horn of Africa alone
commands access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and it is in
close proximity to the Middle Eastern oil fields. 37 At the
southern tip of the continent, the Cape of Good Hope sits
astride one of the world's greatest shipping routes. Africa
also possesses strategic resources that are of great value
particularly chromium and titanium. Africa is also rich in
oil, diamonds, iron, silver, magnese, copper, and
phosphates.38 In a continent of such size and diversity,
to obtain political influence is a difficult task. Indeed for
the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, none of whom
were colonial powers in Africa, securing political influence
has been time consuming and only partially successful.
Instead, African governments have managed to utilize
geographic location and strategic resources more as a means of
leverage over these great powers than the other way around.
37 Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence, p. 3.
"
3Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, the Cubans, and American
Anxieties," Foreign Policy no. 31 (Summer 1978): p. 3.
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C. THE SOVIZET UNION AND AFRICA
"The Soviets have always been aware of Africa in their
global thinking .... Only during the Nikita Khrushchev era did
interests of the Soviet Union and African leaders become a
reality."3 9 Under Khrushchev, the Soviets became flexible in
dealing with Third World regimes and broadened the base of
Soviet relations with Third World Nations. The Soviets
assumed that these Third World nations would have resilience
and possibly serve Soviet foreign policy objectives.
1. The Key Factora Behind Soviet Involvement
Five key factors during this period led to Soviet
involvement in Africa. First, "...[W]ith the collapse of
colonialism in Africa, prospects were good for revolutionary
transformations...and it tried to associate the USSR with the
forces there that it felt would effect such changes."40 In
The Communist Challenge to Africa, Ian Greig discusses how
Lenin stressed the value of colonial territories to Communism.,
In Lenin's view the industrial states and Western Europe
specifically were obliged to embark upon programs of colonial
acquisition in order to develop new markets in which to sell
their goods and to discover new sources of raw materials.
"Hilene Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa, The History
of Involvement, ed., Jo Fisher (Washington, D.C.: University
Press of America, Inc., 1980), p. 148.
4ýDavid E. Albright, Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited
6 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1987), p. 13.
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According to Greig, Lenin concluded that corntrol of these
colonial territories was essential for the continued existence
of European Capitalist states. Thus, Lenin declared ". .. that
if the colonies could be wrested out of colonial control, a
mortal blow could have been struck to the whole capitalist
system itself-thus easing the way for the ultimate victory of
Communism. ,41
The second key factor leading to Soviet involvement in
Africa was the difficulties Moscow was experiencing in
relations with its Arab allies in the Middle East primarily
over the treatment of local communists. If relations failed
to improve, Africa appeared to be a good alternative Third
World ally for the USSR. Third, between 1958 and 1970,
Chinese contracts in Africa had increased rapidly and the
Soviet Union would find satisfaction in any successful policy
that would block the Chinese position. 42
Fourth, in the 1960's, the Soviet Union began
utilizing military instruments as the key policy tool to
obtain strategic and political positions in Africa.
Strategically, the Soviet Union had begun to expand its forces
to the Indian Ocean. "The acquisition of naval access
"41Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa, An
Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies
(Groswell, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd.,
1977), pp. 42-43.
42Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The
Foreign Policy of the People's Reoublic of China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971), p. 45.
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privileges bordering [the African region] serves both
operational and political purposes. The use [of these]
facilities contributes to Moscow's ability to sustain
worldwide deployments and monitor Western naval forces. "43
Fifth, the Soviet Union figured that supporting
National Liberation Movements by supplying them with military
aid might allow the Soviet Union to obtain leverage and hence
some political influence. Although the Soviet Union found it
difficult to achieve significant influence in the region, the
influence it did obtain served to accomplish two of the Soviet
Union's primary foreign policy objectives: countering the
United States and countering China in the region.
Overall, Soviet global planning involved that
successful Soviet policy in Africa might well enhance Moscow's
leverage in world affairs. These calculations reignited
Soviet interest, and ultimately adventurism in Africa.
2. Initial Involvement: The Congo Crisis
Prior to 1960, the Soviet Union did not have any real
ties with Africa except for some minor diplomatic relations
"
3Melvin A. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and the Third
World: The Military Dimension," The Soviet Union and the Third
World: The Last Three Decades, eds., Andrzej Korbonski and
Francis Fukuyama (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press,
1987), p. 48. Another example of favorable African ports are
those located on the Mediterranean. The capability of being
able to use the Algerian naval and air bases would obviously
be of considerable advantage to the Soviet Union in the
furtherance of its strategic policies in the Mediterranean
since the United States maintains such a high level of
activity in the area.
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with the already independent states of Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana,
and Guinea. Beyond diplomatic ties, the Soviet Union did not
have a definitive African foreign policy. The Congo Crisis of
1960 provided the first indication of Moscow's new interests
in African affairs.
As nationalism swept the colony in the late 1950's,
the impetuous preparations for Congolese independence by
Belgium could not make up for the lack of an educated cadre to
run the government and the economy. On July 5, 1960, the
newly installed independent government confronted an attempted
coup d'etat by the Congolese army. Right at independence the
Congo began to quickly deteriorate into chaos and violence.
The Belgians responded by dispatching forces to the Congo to
protect Belgian citizens and economic and mining interests.
However, the Belgian intervention was done without the
permission of the recognized government of the newly
independent Congo which was headed by President Kasavubu and
Prime Minister Lumumba. Both Kasavubu and Lumumba solicited
support of the United Nations against the Belgian intervention
and requested assistance to restore the Congolese
administration. By July 11, 1960, the providence of Katanga
declared its independence from the Congo, creating opposing
factions within this new state.
As a supporter of National Liberation Movements and
early independence everywhere, the Soviet Union opposed the
Belgium intervention in the Congo. The Soviet Union publicly
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condemned the Belgian intervention, and "officially condemned
it in an uncompromising tone and blamed the Belgian move on
the N.A.T.0."44 Soviet Union President Nikita Khrushchev
received a request from the recognized Congolese government
for assistance with the United Nations. The Soviets obliged
this request and additionally offered the Congolese government
10,000 tons of emergency food supplies.45 Consequently, the
Soviet Union became intensely involved in the Congo Crisis
providing economic and eventually military assistance.
Henceforth, from 1960 to the mid-1980's, the Soviet Union
maintained heavy commitments towards Africa.
D. CUBA AND AFRICA
"We have supported the progressive governments and
revolutionary movements in Africa since the triumph of
our revolution and we shall continue to do so."
Fidel Castro, 1975
1. Brief Overview of Cuba's Involvement in Africa
Cuban foreign policy in Africa was consistent and well
established for more than a decade prior to the large-scale
build-up in Angola which occurred in the Autumn of 1975. In
1959, Cuba began establishing active missions throughout
Africa. In order to help defeat the French in Algeria, from
1960 to 1961, Castro sent medical personnel and arms to the
National Liberation Front in Algeria. In 1961, the Cubans
"Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa, pp. 96-97.
4S3 bid. p. 97.
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were also present in Ghana. They set up a training facility
which specialized in training guerilla warfare techniques.
During the border conflict between Algeria and Morocco
(1963-1-965), Cuban combat troops were deployed to assist the
Algerians. From 1965-1966, Cuba installed a sizeable advisory
military mission in the Congo-Brazzaville, headed by Ernesto
"Che" Guevara. It was this mission that assisted in deterring
a Congolese Army revolt in June 1966.
By June 1966, Castro had begun to supply military aid
to the regime of Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea. Assistance was
not only in the form of weapons but personnel as well. Cuba
provided military personnel to augment Sekou Toure's
Presidential Guard. In the late 1960's Cuban domestic
problems resulted in a decline of Cuba's military involvement
in Africa. This meant not a withdrawal of personnel and
equipment already in place but rather a reluctance to provide
additional personnel and equipment.
The early 1970'1s, after the restructuring and build-up
of the Cuban armed forces, initiated a period of accelerated
Cuban aid to Africa. Castro dispatched new military missions
to Sierra Leone in 1972, Somalia in 1974, and Algeria in 1975.
Che Guevara was a very important figure that assisted Cuba in
its successful ability to establish a good rapport with Africa
and establish a Cuban foreign policy in the region.
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2. Irnesto "Che" Guevara
Ernesto "Che" Guevara (1928-1967) was born in
Argentina and very well educated. In 1953, he received a
medical degree from the University of Buenos Aires. After he
obtained this degree he began to travel extensively throughout
Latin America. In conjunction with his travels he acquired
connections with leftist movements primarily in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. "It was in Guatemala
which finally convinced him of the necessity for armed
struggle and for taking the initiative against
imperialism. "6 Che joined Castro's revolutionary group
while Castro was exiled in Mexico and he trained Castro's
forces in guerilla warfare. Che later wrote about his first
meeting with Castro and his decision to join Castro's cause,
"It would have taken very little to persuade me to join any
revolution against tyranny.""7
Guevara was an avid Marxist-Leninist and heavily
influenced Castro in his decision to align Cuba with other
communist nations. After the revolution, he became one of
Castro's main advisors and served as President of the National
Bank of Cuba from 1959-1961. Later he became minister of
industry as well. After four years, Guevara became
disenchanted and longed to wage the revolutionary cause once
"Sinclair, Che Guevara, p. 12.
"7Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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again. Thus, in 1965, Che left Cuba to further the cause of
revolutionary activities elsewhere.
In April of 1965, Che led two hundred Cuban
"international soldiers" to establish an anti-imperialist
alliance and to conduct warfare in the Congo against
secessionist movements. Additionally, during this period, he
toured the countries of the Casablanca Group: Algeria, Guinea,
Ghana, and Congo-Brazzaville. It was during this trip that
Guevaca "established contacts and laid the groundwork for many
of the policy decisions that [Cuba] followed in the next 10-15
years." 4
Although Guevara was unsuccessful in organizing the
anti-imperialist alliance, he considered "...Africa to be one
of the most important if not the most important battlefield
against all forms of exploitation in the world."4"
3. Now Africa Moets Cuba's Foreign Policy Objectives
Why was Cuba so motivated in its foreign policy.
objectives towards Africa? Many observers, such as Wayne S.
Smith and Paul Bia Abudu, have written that Cuba's policy
toward Africa was internationalist. That is, conflict
involving a Cuban ally becomes internationalized by incurring
"Michael A. Samuels, et al., eds., Implications of Soviet
and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy, (Washington,
D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Georgetown University, 1979), p. 44.
"4Durch, From Algeria to Angola, p. 18.
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the involvement of Western or of pro-Western nations, then
Cuba will undoubtedly respond within the limits of its
military capability. Thus, in Africa, "Cuba had little to
gain economically or strategically by promoting revolution....
Ideologically, however, Cuba has always taken the principle of
international solidarity very seriously--no doubt because the
survival of the Cuban revolution itself has been so dependent
upon international assistance." 50
Africa met Cuba's foreign policy objectives most
eloquently. It was Cuba's solid commitment to African
liberation struggles, as emphasized above, that has made it
possible to understand why Cuba has been so motivated in its
foreign policy objectives towards Africa. Africa had become
"an ideal [show] place to [demonstrate] international
solidarity that [was] needed to win the wars of national
liberation."5 1
It is evident that Cuba possessed an African policy
for more than a decade prior to the Angolan War in 1975.
Cuba's involvement in Africa was primarily self-motivated and
based on similar ideologies. Its presence in Africa sought to
"sWayne S. Smith, "Castro's Cuba: Soviet Partner or
Nonaligned?" The Cuba Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary
Society, eds., Phillip Brenner, William M. LeoGrande, Donna
Rich, and Daniel Siegel, (New York: Grove Press, 1989), p.
377. Also see Paul Bia Abudu, Cuban Policy Toward Africa and
African Responses 1959-1976 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University
Microfilms International, 1983), pp. 10-16.
"
51Paul Bia Abudu, Cuban Policy Toward Africa, p. 4.
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broaden Cuba's political and diplomatic relations, and to
furnish elements of military assistance whenever it appeared
appropriate. Africa also provided Castro with other
motivations for him to send his troops: as colonialism
collapsed in Portuguese-Africa, Africa appeared to be more
ripe for revolution than in Latin America. Besides which, the
United States tended to be much less active in Africa than in
Latin America; allowing Castro more room to operate.
Castro's revolution required legitimacy. Assisting
national liberation movements in Africa enabled him to present
the Cuban people with a "cause" they could easily relate to
and rally behind. By expanding his revolution to Africa it
fulfilled, what he probably perceived as, his internationalist
responsibility of supporting Third World nations and being the
exemplary force behind the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Furthermore, Castro increased his military force to more than
ten times what would be required for a country the size of
Cuba, thus, deploying to Africa allowed Castro a larger stage
with which to demonstrate his growing successes of utilizing
an autonomous foreign policy.
The following section will examine Cuba's involvement
in the Angolan War. It will attempt to illustrate that even
though Cuba required the assistance of the Soviet Union to be
successful, Cuba's decision to assist in this situation was an
autonomous decision.
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V. CUBA AND ANGOLA
A. TIE ANGOLAN WAR
Today, Angola remains engulfed in a brutal civil war. The
cause is a simple one: who is going to control the country.
The origins of this ongoing struggle for power can be traced
directly to Portuguese colonialism and the three factions that
emerged to challenge the Portuguese. Currently, only two of
the original three groups remain locked in this brutal
struggltý.
Struggle for power originated in the April 1974 military
coup against the Portuguese government of Antonio de Oliveira
Salazar. In January 1975, the new Portuguese leadership
agreed to transfer power in Angola over to a Transitional
Government that was composed of three political parties that
possessed disparate ideological positions.5 2  The three
factions included: the Movimiento Popular de Libertacao
(MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA),
and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
(UNITA). Consequently, the Angolan War centered around these
three nationalistic movements vying for power by the proposed
independence day of November 11, 1975.
32Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, pp. 9-11.
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1. Background On the Three Movements: The NPLa
The MPLA is the oldest liberation movement in Angola,
the most ideologically sophisticated and today controls the
government of Luanda. It is composed of Angolans who have
been subjected to Portuguese education and influenced by
Portuguese culture.' 3  This faction is urban-oriented and
urban-based. It draws its support from the Mbundu people who
are situated in Luanda. The MPLA. is composed mostly of
assimilados (Africans who have been subjected to Portuguese
education and influenced by Portuguese culture; these people
are treated almost as equals) and mesticos (individuals with
one white parent and one negro parent; mulattoes).
Since the mid-1960's, the MPLA has been supported by
the Soviet Union and Cuba. In fact, many leaders studied in
Cuba including some who later became members of the MPLA
Central Committee and Ministers of the Angolan Government."
When the MPLA was initially established in 1956 they contended
that they "...would fight for an independent Marxist Angola,
governed by a democratic and popular government of the working
S3John Marcum, The Angolan Warfare, pp. 276-277.
"Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution,
Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1989), pp. 131-132.
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people, irrespective of racial distinction, social origin,
religious belief, and the individual make-up. 55
Between 1962 and 1979 Agostinho Neto was the elected
president of the MPLA. In 1962, when Neto first became the
leader, an ultra-leftist group headed up by the Secretary-
General, Veriato da Cruz, initially refused to accept Neto's
position and attempted to set up a splinter MPLA.s6
Consequently, under Neto, the MPLA experienced personal and
factional rivalries resulting in an evident disunity within
the movement. This disunity became a major setback to MPLA
objectives.
2. The luLA
Although the FNLA was the strongest faction that
existed at the start of the Angolan war, ultimately it was
unable to survive its own battlefield errors and the cessation
of external assistance. Founded in 1958, the FNLA, like
UNITA, possessed a primitive ideological mixture of racism and
tribal populism. The FNLA members were less educated, less
urban and although they lacked a coherent ideology, they
maintained strong anti-Marxist sentiments.5 7 They drew their
551alk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 84; Oleg Ignatyev, Secret
Weapon in Africa, trans. David Fidlon (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1977), p. 7.
"
5Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, Afrocommunism (New
York: African Publishing Company, 1986), p. 101.
"
57Marcum, The Angolan Warfare, pp. 276-277; Klinghoffer,
The Angolan War, p. 13.
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support from the BaKongo people who were situated in the far
north-west (near Zaire) and in Cabinda. Within this faction
the authority of the FNLA was not only black, but racist as
well. The FNLA vilified not only the Portuguese settlers but
the mesticos and assimilados they had created. While the MPLA
focused primarily on education and mobilization, the FNLA's
approach was basically military. Led by Holden Roberto, "the
FNLA [in 1975] had more men under arms than the MPLA and UNITA
combined and it had the most convenient base of operations, in
Zaire."so The FNLA was heavily supported by the United
States, South Africa, China, and Zaire.
3. UNITA
Along with the MPLA, UNITA is the other key contender
for power in the Angolan civil war today. UNITA, formed in
1966, was the last of the three movements to be formed. Jonas
Savimbi, an ex-FNLA member, established this movement.
Initially UNITA seriously lacked educated men and arms, but it
had the largest ethnic base. Located near the southeastern
border, it relied heavily on the neighbor nation of Zambia.
Initially, Cuba trained and supported both members of the MPLA
and members of UNITA since both factions were fighting against
Portugal. However, by 1974, UNITA and the MPLA were fighting
each other and as a result, Cuba discontinued its support of
UNITA and maintained the MPLA as the faction that should take
'*Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 13.
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control of the government.5 ' Eventually, UNITA found it
necessary to form a coalition with the FNLA if it was to have
a chance of survival. With significant external backing by
the United States and South Africa, UNITA has been able to
prevent the MPLA from consolidating its control in Angola.
B. TONARDS INDZPZNDZNCZ: THE ALVOR
In Mombasa, Kenya, between January 3-5, 1975, President
Jomo Kenyatta, of Kenya, attempted to bring the three movement
leaders (Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi) together to work out an
agreement that would prevent a civil war in Angola. From this
meeting they reached an agreement of cooperation. The Alvor
Agreement, of January 15, 1975, called for the installation of
a Transitional Government, composed of 8,000 men from each
movement and 24,000 Portuguese troops by January 31st. 60 The
success of this Transitional Government would lead to Angolan
independence by November 11, 1975 and the removal of all
Portuguese soldiers.
Kenyatta was able to achieve only temporary success with
this cooperation agreement. The factionalization within the
HPLA created problems in cooperation. The already expelled
Daniel Chipenda and 2,000-3,000 of his affiliated troops
aligned themselves with the FNLA. The HPLA viewed the FNLA's
Dýominguez, To Make a World Safe, pp. 131-132.
"•Ibid., p. 15.
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acceptance of these troops as an infringement of the Alvor
Agreement and hostilities increased significantly. Another
factor that eventually led to the continued Angolan conflict
was the increased rupport the three movements received from
external sources.
C. THE MAJOR ZXTZRNAL ACTORS
1. The Soviet Union
Although the Soviet Union has always been interested
in Africa, until 1974 the Soviets provided only nominal
political, ideological, and military support to the MPLA. The
Soviet Union viewed the MPLA "as the only legitimate
liberation organization in Angola," 61 and began supplying
assistance in order to guarantee that the MPLA would emerge as
the future government in Angola.
MPLA leader Agostinho Neto's ties to the Soviet Union
were extensive even before he took over. Shortly after he was
elected president of the MPLA, the Soviet Union began to
actively support the MPLA. Support was provided in terms of
military assistance, arms and training, and education in
Soviet institutions.
Early on the Soviets saw that the MPLA suffered from
factionalization and encouraged unification among them. They
even discontinued military assistance temporarily so that the
e3Kurt M. Campbell, "Southern Africa in Soviet Foreign
Policy," Adelphi Papers no. 227 (Winter 1987/88): p. 6.
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arms that were provided would not be viewed as a contributing
factor to the strife the MPLA was experiencing. Prior to the
Alvor Agreement, the MPLA agreed to unify, but, this did not
last long.
Although the Soviets believed that the MPLA should be
the leading force after Angola's independence, the Soviets
supported the prevention of an Angolan civil war. When the
Alvor Agreement was signed by all members, the Soviets
encouraged the MPLA to adopt it and abide by it. In their
continued struggle for power, the FNLA troops, along with
their new allies of the Chipenda faction, moved into Angola
from Zaire and began initiating small attacks against MPLA
members. This was made possible because shortly after the
Alvor Agreement was signed and the FNLA began receiving
increased aid from both the United States and China. This aid
allowed the FNLA to achieve "apparent military primacy.""2
The U.S. used a "crisis management committee,"
composed of senior policymakers to oversee covert operations.
This committee was known as the "40 Committee." Immediately
after the signing of the Alvor Agreement, the "40 committee"
began making policy decisions to support the pro-Western
movements and augmented covert aid to the FNLA. Such an
increase in U.S. aid resulted in undermining the loyalty of
the FNLA's participation to the Alvor Agreement. Additionally
42John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs 54,
no. 3 (April 1976): p. 41?.
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China, provided the FNLA with hundreds of tons of arms as well
as Chinese instructors.13 "The levels of foreign assistance
[were] of paramount political importance in the Angolan
conflict. Certain foreign actions, no doubt, sparked action
and reaction."64 Consequently, the Soviets bolstered their
assistance to the MPLA. Although the weaponry was provided,
the MPLA lacked the training and expertise to operate these
Soviet arms. Extensive training began in order to better
equip the MPLA and bring the troops up to military parity with
the FNLA.' 5 The Soviets claimed that their increased support
to the MPLA was to provide them with sufficient weaponry to
counter the FNLA/UNITA coalition and also to counter the
United States and Chinese support of the FNLA.
In a July summit conference held by the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) another attempt was made to try to
reconcile the three movements. To show their support of the
conference, the Soviet Union, for a second time, discontinued
military support in hopes that the OAU would be able to
convince the three movements that negotiated settlements were
'
3Ibid.
"Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy, p. 85.
'
8Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 16. Also Marcum, The
Angolan Warfare, p. 413, provides detailed accounts of these
events that took place in Angola. He suggests that the
Soviets renewed assistance was "perhaps a move triggered, more
than anything else, by the unpleasant prospect of seeing their
global rival s]...for influence among revolutionaries, China
[and the U.S.] assist the movement of [their] choice to
military victory."
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in everyone's best interest. Consequently, the Soviet Union
did not re-establish its arms support until September/October
1975."6
Neto requested another increase in extensive Soviet
Union military assistance (i.e. trained combat troops), but
was turned down and the MPLA became increasingly skeptical of
the reliability of the Soviet Union's commitment to
assistance. The Soviet Union feared that the sending of
troops would lead to the deterioration of detente with the
United States. Thus, Neto turned to Fidel Castro, who
subsequently provided the MPLA with Cuban combat troops to
fight along side Neto's forces. Once Cuba committed their
troops to the Angolan conflict, the Soviet Union provided
extensive military assistance. The combination of Soviet
military arms and logistic equipment along with Cuban combat
troops secured what initially appeared to be a total victory
for the MPLA. In reality, however, the victory meant control
of the capital, Luanda, the oil fields of Cabinda, and control
of the immediate surrounding areas. The rest of Angola
largely came under the control of UNITA.
2. Cuba
Cuba's early alliance with the MPLA was based
primarily on ideological reasons. They "were anxious to play
a leadership role in the Third World and (they] had a strong
""Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, pp. 22-23.
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ideological commitment to furthering the cause of
socialism." 67  In 1965, the Cubans began providing aid,
military training, and education to the MPLA. Unlike the
Soviet -Union, Cuba was not under the same constraints of
establishing and maintaining world-wide detente. Thus, the
Cubans were able to continuously supply the MPLA with the
necessities they required.
Cuba's commitment to send combat troops was probably
an independent decision based on Cuban foreign policy
objectives and their long time alliance with the MPLA.
William M. LeoGrande pro'ides statements made by Castro in
Granma Weekly Review, dated April 18, 1976 that states, "The
USSR is extraordinarily respectful in its relations with Cuba.
A decision of that nature could only be made by our own
party." Cuba's decision to assist the MPLA was self-motivated
and consistent with its foreign policy initiatives. Some
critics claim that the Soviets had "no idea" of the decision
but that is probably presumptuous." It appears to be
evident that the decision made by Cuba was an autonomous one.
The best indication of this autonomous decision is
that initially Cuba deployed its troops to Africa without the
7 Ibid., p. 115.
"soLeogrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 21, makes this
presumption. In another article by David Binder, "Kissinger
Believes Cuba Exports Revolution Again," The New York Times,
5 February 1976, p. 15C, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
articulates his opinion to the same effect.
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assistance of the Soviet Union. The first Cuban-deployed
ships landed at Pointe Noire in early October 1975. These
troops were then taken by train to Cabinda. Other Cuban-
deployed ships disembarked troops directly at Port Amboim,
which is south of Luanda." 9  Cuban airlift transports also
provided troops to Angola. However, upon the request of the
United States, essential refueling stations such as Barbados,
the Azores, Santa Maria, and Portugal, began denying Cuba
access. Consequently, the Cubans requested assistance from
the Soviet Union to transport troops. In early January 1976,
the Soviet Union provided two IL-62's to Cuba, and began
flying Cuban troops into Luanda. Cuban arrivals to Luanda
increased from 400 a week in December 1975, when Cuba was
transporting its troops, to 1000 a week in January 1976 with
Soviet assistance.70
Cuba's military involvement in Angola consisted of
five separate roles: 1) to train and arm the MPLA with Soviet
weapons in the Congo and Cuba; 2) to provide advisors to the
MPLA within Angola; 3) to establish military training centers
in four Angolan locations; 4) to furnish the MPLA with Cuban
combat troops for incorporation into MPLA units; and 5)to
0 Durch, From Algeria to Angola, p. 44.
70Ibid., pp. 48-49.
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dispatch intact and trained military units for combat
alongside the MPLA."
As the South African'2 offensive increased so did the
dispatch of additional Cuban troops. Between November 1975,
when the MPLA requested Cuban troops to assist them, and March
1976, when the MPLA had taken control of the offensive,
between 18,000 and 36,000 Cuban combat troops had arrived in
Angola. LeoGrande notes that "[m]ilitarily, Cuba's troops
made the difference."' 4
There was a brief period when Cuban combat troops
began withdrawing from Angola. This withdrawal process was a
direct result of the cessation of aid to the FNLA and UNITA by
the United States. However, South African support did not
dissipate and as a result of continued conflict in the region
71Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 111.
"72South Africa's increased involvement in the region was
partly motivated by what it perceived would be continuous and
significant U.S. backing. However, once the Cubans began
sending forces to assist the MPLA and regained the offensive
back, the U.S. Congress , on December 16,1980, passed the
Clark Amendment which stated complete and total disassociation
with Angola. As the legislation stated, "Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be
provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of
promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity
of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to
conduct military or paramilitary operations in
Angola..." ([Emphasis added] Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Possible Violation or
Circumvention of the Clark Amendment. 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 July 1987, p. 109)
"73LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 20.
74'bid., p. 19.
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Cuba halted the withdrawal upon the request of the MPLA.
Consequently, between 1975 and 1989 there was a significant
Cuban presence in Angola of approximately 50,000 troops.
Since the recent withdrawal of Cuban troops (which will be
discussed later), approximately 15,000 still remain as August
1990.75
3. Cuban-Soviet Cooperation
Prior to 1975, Cuban and Soviet policies towards
Angola were markedly different. Cuba pursued a militant
policy based on its fundamental ideology of spreading
revolution and supporting liberal progressive movements. The
Soviet Union's purpose was not so much ideological as it was
strategic and political. This was an area in which Cuba
publicly criticized the Soviets.
Politically, the Soviet Union viewed that the success
of an MPLA government in Angola which possessed pro-Marxist
views, would be beneficial to the Soviet Union. Consequently,
aid provided to the MPLA faction was given in the belief that
the Soviet Union would have some political influence over
Angola if the NPLA were successful. It would mark the first
time that the Soviet Union would have the ability to become a
major actor in the region's political affairs."
73s" 3 5 , 0 0 0 Soldiers said to Leave Angola," The Miami
Herald, 5 August 1990, P. 4A.
"7Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 28.
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Strategically, Soviet influence over the region could
be "...analyzed in terms of superpower competition...""7
Soviet presence in the region could "jeopardize the security
of the United States and other Western powers as the flow of
oil around the Cape could be obstructed by Soviet ships
stationed in Angolan ports." 78
By the 1970's, Cuba's foreign policy objectives
evolved while the Soviet Union's basically remained the same.
Cuba began placing an increasing emphasis on expanding its
influence throughout the Third World. The Soviets continued
to view Africa as a political and strategic asset and strived,
as its principal objective, to reduce Western and Chinese
influence in this region and other Third World nations.7 '
The Cuban-Soviet partnership in the Angolan War was
not completely orchestrated from beginning to end. Until
November 1975, the two countries acted fairly independently.
However, this partnership provided the perfect situation where
both countries could achieve their individual foreign policy
objectives. "Their policy objectives, though not identical,
"7Ibid., p. 73.
"7 Ibid., p. 76.
"7*LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, pp. 30-31, 65. Also
Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, pp. 73-76, 119.
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were not in conflict, [they] were attainable only through
cooperation. "s
4. The Chinese Impact
- The only movement which received substantial Chinese
backing was that of the FNLA. In 1974, an agreement was
signed for military aid to be provided to the FNLA. China
provided 112 military instructors to Zaire in order to train
FNLA guerrillas which would eventually be able to form an army
division. Two-thirds of this army would be equipped with
Chinese arms. Arms supply continued for approximately
fourteen months, but with the increased Soviet-Cuban arms
build-up to the MPLA, and the decrease in U.S. support, the
Chinese to, virtually ceased all transfers by the end of
1975.61 China terminated its arms transfers when South
Africa began supporting the pro-western movements. Sensitive
to what China saw as its leadership role in Africa, China did
not want to be associated with "racist" South A.Zrica in any
way.
IoLeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 31. It should
be noted that in the case of Ethiopia, Cuba was less willing
to provide combat troops and favored negotiated settlements
instead. However, with the Soviets insistence, the Cubans
provided the necessary troops. Consequently, as a result of
the Cubans reluctance, the Soviet-Cuban alliance in Ethiopia
was more planned out than the alliance in Angola. This will
be discussed in detail in the following section.
"eWorld Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIFRI) Yearbook 1976 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1976), p. 57.
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5. The United States
During the early 1970's, conditions existed in the
United States that prevented the U.S. from taking a more
assertive or vocal role towards Cuban and Soviet involvement
in Africa. These conditions included: public and
congressional preoccupation with "avoiding anymore Vietnams;"
the weakening of the American presidency as a result of the
Watergate affair; and the unwillingness of U.S. policy-makers
to use military power in the Third World. 2  Consequently,
the United States had accepted the fact that it would have to
live with Fidel Castro, and, given the fear of another Vietnam
in Africa, would not consider sending U.S. troops overseas to
stop him.
Since its independence, the United States supported
Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo). The FNLA movement in
Angola requested aid and assistance from Zaire, fully aware of
its ties with the United States. Zaire had been the key to
American policy in the region. Thus, it was not unusual that
the United States would support Zaire's preference for the
FNLA.
While there are some arguments which suggest that
Soviet assistance to the MPLA was in direct reaction to the
United State's "40 Committee" assistance to the FNLA, this
argument cannot be viewed as valid. First, the Soviets began
"02Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa, " The
World Today, p. 47.
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providing military assistance to the MPLA immediately after
the military coup in 1974. Although Zaire began providing
increased aid to the FNLA soon after the coup, 83 it was not
until March 1975 that the United States made this policy
official. The policy, formulated by the "40 Committee," was
to increase aid to Zaire and Zambia for the direct purpose of
helping them assist the FNLA and the UNITA.
Secondly, if further Soviet aid, after the signing of
the Alvor Agreement, was in reaction to American covert aid,
the Soviet response was clearly disproportionate, "...the
United States only provided a small amount of cash [and arms]
while the Soviet Union introduced a large quantity of
arms."84 The United State's role in Angola was minimal in
comparison to that of the Soviet Union.
In November 1975, when there was an increase in Cuban
and Soviet involvement, the Senate voted to decrease support
for the FNLA. By March 1976, when the MPLA had won the
offensive, the U.S. voted to terminate aid altogether.
6. Cuban-U.S. Relations
Cuban-U.S. relations began to improve in the early
1970's. Until November 1975, these improved relations showed
signs of increased economic opportunities for Cuba. The
°3It appears that the first shipment from the U.S. to
Zaire was to resupply Zaire with aid they had already been
distributed to the FNLA.
"°4Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 89.
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Soviets saw this as a possible chance to be relieved of some
of their economic responsibilities.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued a statement
on March 1, 1975 that stated "that the U.S. government saw no
vrlztue in perpetual antagonism with Cuba [emphasis in
original]...".5 However, this situation regressed with the
advent of Cuban combat troops dispatched to Angola in November
1975. Consequently, Cuban-U.S. relations began to deteriorate
quickly because the United States viewed Cuba's involvement as
jeopardizing any chance for continued improvement of
relations. Cuba did not succumb. It viewed this threat as
another example of the United States seeking to influence
Cuba's foreign policy behavior. President Gerald Ford
reiterated that in the U.S. view, "The action of the Cuban
government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any
opportunity for improvement of relations with the United
States."96
Moreover, the United States refused to recognize the
regime in Luanda, it sought to isolate the Angolan government
from World Bank loans, U.S. foreign aid or other assistance;
and it ultimately resumed direct assistance to UNITA following
the revocation of the Clark Amendment.
"$ýErisman, Cuba's International Relations, p. 44.
"eOLou Cannon, " Ford Assails Cuba, Russia Over Angola,"
The Washington Post, 21 December 1975, pp. 1A, 15A.
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D. CURRINT RESULTS OF CUBANAND 0SVZET ASSISTANCZ TO AFRICA
"...[T]he history of Angola has been one of discontinuity
and crisis. War among the three nationalist movements and
infighting among the top MPLA leaders have consumed the
country for many years."17 Although the MPLA was successful
in obtaining the offensive and has since been recognized
globally as the faction in control of Angola, problems
continued. First, the death of President Neto in 1979
reopened the question of leadership within the MPLA. Second,
the early 1980's proved to be a period when UNITA joined
forces with South Africa to fight against the MPLA. This
amounted to extra time and effort on the part of the MPLA to
maintain national defense. By 1988 it appeared that the
continuous civil war had yet to run its full course. The
Cubans still maintained a sizeable force in the region (50,000
troops) and the Soviet Union continued to provide large
amounts of aid to the MPLA with no real apparent end to the
civil war on the horizon. It became obvious that a solution
to end the struggle was necessary. No longer could Cuban and
Soviet support be a factor in this conflict. Diplomatic
solutions would be required.
1. C-.ba's Withdrawal of Troops from Angola
Three summits were held in Africa in 1988. The
Gbadolite Summit on June 22nd, the Harare Summit on August
70ttaway and Ottaway, Afrocommunism, p. 125.
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22nd, and the Kinshasa Summit on September 11th."8 The
Summit goals were to establish a cease-fire and to initiate
direct political negotiations. They were unable to achieve
either. The willingness to achieve these objectives was
present in these meetings but some particirants questioned the
impartiality of the mediator, President Mobutu. Consequently,
on December 22, 1988 in New York, the United States brokered
an external settlement. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State Chester A. Crocker was in charge of mediating this round
of negotiations which ended successfully, resulting in an
agreement signed by South Africa, Angola, and Cuba.
In 1987, prior to the three summits, Cuban officials
had already indicated that they were ready to take part in
discussions that would initiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops
in Angola. Under the agreement signed in December, Cuban
troops would withdraw from Angola. South Africa agreed to end
support for the rebels and to grant independence to Namibia.
Completion of this withdrawal was scheduled for mid-1990."
"Warren Clark, Jr., "National Reconciliation Efforts for
Angola," United States Department of State Bureau of Public
Affairs 1217 (Washington, D.C.: 7 November 1989): p. 1.
"Ibid. Additionally, Michael G. Kozak, "Cuba: A Threat
to Peace and Security in Our Hemisphere," United States
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1204 (Washington,
D.C.: 4 September 1989): p. 4A.
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2. Temporary Suspension of Withdrawal
In January 1990, Cuba temporarily suspended the
withdrawal of its troops from Angola as a protest to the
killing-of four Cuban soldiers by U.S.-backed Angolan rebels.
Of the estimated 50,000 troops that had been deployed to
Angola over the past fifteen years, approximately 31,000
troops had departed by the time that Cuba initially suspended
troop withdrawal. 90  All indications to date show that the
withdrawal continues now and no further problems have
occurred. Since January 1990, approximately 4,000 additional
Cuban troops have exited Angola and as a result of the
temporary suspension, the completion of the Agreement has been
pushed back to mid-1991. 91
Is the current situation, with the withdrawal of Cuban
combat troops, a result of Soviet pressures or a result of
Cuba's own foreign policy initiatives? While there has been
no verbal direct pressure, the Soviet Union's disengagement
throughout the Third World, in order to deal with its own
problems, has forced Soviet Third World clients to re-evaluate
their foreign policy. Thus, it appears, from the little that
has been written about the Cuban troop withdrawal, that it was
the Cubans that suggested the United States preside over these
"
0Elaine Sciolino, "Blaming U.S., Cuba Suspends Pullout,"
The New York Times, 26 January 1990, p. 12A.
91"35,000 Soldiers said to leave Angola," The Miami
Herald, 5 August 1990.
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negotiations. Soviet representation was not a part of these
meetings. The successful outcome of this Summit, in New York,
benefitted not only the Angolans and South Africans but also
the Cubans. Consequently, Cuban withdrawal of troops has not
been primarily as a result of any direct pressure from the
Soviet Union, but rather based on agreements between the MPLA,
UNITA, South Africa, and Cuba.
While there are no records indicating direct pressure
has been applied for Cuba's withdrawal from Angola, the
significant indirect pressures should be noted. First, at the
Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), held in February 1986, Gorbachev focused
primarily on his country's domestic-economic concerns and on
improving and stabilizing relations with the United States.
Little to no reference was made to Soviet goals towards the
Third World. The conspicuous lack of Third World reference
was significant because it illustrated that Moscow's role in
the Third World was of less importance than it had been in
previous years.' 2 This caused concern among many key Soviet
client leaders, specifically, Mengitsu of Ethiopia, Dos Santos
of Angola, and of course, Castro.
Second, the Soviet Union has come out and stated that
it intends to resolve regional conflicts and no longer call
'
2Francis T. Miko, "The 27th Soviet Party Congress and the
West," Survival 28, no. 4 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, July/August 1986): pp. 291-305; Goodman,
"The Military Dimension," pp. 59-61.
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for the violent overthrow of South Africa. Finally, the
Soviet Union's domestic problems are so great that it is too
expensive to continue supplying countries like Angola or Cuba
with the levels of aid they had previously been receiving.
With this in mind it is evident that Cuba and Angola probably
felt a real constraint, and coming to some sort of terms in
the region was necessary.
Thus, the reduction does not indicate that Castro has
abandoned his goals of promoting revolution abroad nor does it
indicate that the withdrawal be done at the cost of their
basic socialist ideology (as seen by their temporary halt of
withdrawing troops in January). This withdrawal will allow
Cuba to focus on its domestic policy and to try to reduce the
costs of deploying troops abroad.
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VI. CUBA AND ETHIOPIA
A. BACKGROUND ON CONFLICTS WITHIN THE REGION
In 1941, for the second time, Haile Selassie became
Emperor of Ethiopia with the support of both Great Britain and
the United States. For the following 33 years the United
States was Ethiopia's primary foreign ally and purveyor of
economic and military assistance. In February 1974, Emperor
Haile Selassie's troops refused to act against urban strikers
and demonstrators. The aging Haile Selassie lost the support
and the loyalty of his troops. Within two months, the
military had established an alternative center of government
power, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC),
referred to as the gue.9 3 In September, the Emperor had
been deposed and by December the Dergue stated that its
ultimate objective was socialism."
This placed both the Soviet Union and Cuba in a dilemma.
Although they were gladdened that the Dergue was pursuing a
communist course, both countries had armed and trained
separatist guerrillas in the Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea
03Legum and Lee, eds., The Horn of Africa pp. vii-xiii;
William M. LeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, pp. 35-36.
'
4Morris Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa: New Dimemsions
of Soviet Global Power (The University of Miami: Advanced
International Studies Institute in Association with, 1980), p.
34.
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and Tigre and had done the same for the Somalian army. Each
were Marxist-Leninist organizations contending for autonomy
from the central government. As long as the central
government was pro-Western and backed by the United States and
other Western countries, Cuban and Soviet interests in the
region supported these opposing guerrillas and the Somalian
army. The question arose to what they should do now that
these Marxist-Leninist factions they had been supporting for
more than a decade were fighting a newly proclaimed Marxist-
Leninist government.
1. Ethiopia and Somalia
One of the biggest internal conflicts within the Horn
of Africa has been the dispute of territory between Ethiopia
and Somalia known as the Ogaden desert. Relations between the
two countries have been strained since the 1960's when Somalia
gained its independence. The Ogaden is not the only disputed
territory Somalia claims. Other sources of conflict are the
territories of Djibouti and Northern Kenya(See Figure 3 for
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These quarrels were a result of the failure of the European
colonialists to delineate acceptable territorial boundaries in
the region. Throughout the years, small skirmishes have been
common -and sometimes exploded into brief armed conflicts
between regular forces.
2. Ethiopia and Zritoea
The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has been
fighting against the Ethiopian government since 1960. It is
Marxist in orientation and is situated in the north along the
Red Sea. The area itself is of little importance, and was
hardest hit by the famines of the 1980's. Its importance lies
in its ports, for without them Ethiopia is a landlocked nation
(See figure 4 for illustration of the region).
Eritrea was a separate territory under Italian control
during the colonial period. The Eritrean insurgency was a
result of the Ethiopian government, in 1962, unilaterally
abrogating an approved United Nations' agreement.
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The agreement, approved in 1952, joined Eritrea and Ethiopia
as a federal state. "Historically the Eritrean's greatest
weakness has been internal conflicts. In 1970 the [EPLF]
split from the pro-Islamic Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
and the rival movements spent much of the subsequent decade
fighting one another. In July 1977, however, when Somalia
invaded the Ogaden, the ELF and EPLF signed an agreement at
Sudanese urging to coordinate 90 percent of Eritrea's
territory and population and held the provincial capital of
Asmara under siege.""s Originally, Eritrea fought to regain
Eritrean status in Ethiopia, but as the struggle has prolonged
and intensified, their objectives have changed. The
Eritrean's goal now is to become completely independent.
D. TR SOVIET KNION' S INTEREST IN ETHIOPIA
In order to fully understand the difference between Cuba's
involvement in Angola and its involvement in Ethiopia it is
important to illustrate the long ties the Soviet Union has had
with Ethiopia. The history of the Russian involvement in
Ethiopia is far more extensive than that of the United States,
China, or Cuba for that matter. Those who could not
understand the sudden willingness of the Soviet Union to
switch from an alliance with the Somalis to one with the
Ethiopians in 1976-1977 were probably not aware of the rich
"SLeoGrande, Cuba's Policy in Africa, p. 42.
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hundred-year relationship of the Russians and the Ethiopians.
The Russian hospital in Addis Ababa has been a highly visible
16
symbol of interest since its construction in the mid-19th
century, and Ethiopian history records the important role of
Russian military advisors in the defeat of the Italian army in
1896. The stated Russian purpose in 1896 was not that
different from the intention in 1976: "to defeat the forces of
imperialism (Italy, Britain, and the Ottomans) in a region
where Russia had been excluded from the imperialist
spoils. "9"
It was these ties and the strategic importance of Ethiopia
that preceded the Soviets' allegiance to this nation and
brought the Cubans in to assist, as it was Cuba's ties and
ideological bonds with Angola that brought the Soviets in to
assist in that conflict. The key difference is that in Angola
the Soviets were not asked to compromise their foreign policy
objectives or ideological bonds. In Ethiopia, in contrast,
Cuba recognized the serious problems that could develop
between Cuba and the Soviet Union if Cuba could not find a way
to converge its foreign policy interests with the Soviet Union
in Ethiopia. The Cubans reassessed their position regarding
the conflicts in Ethiopia. Cuba found it easier in the
"Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations, Volume
Three of Soviet-Third World Relations (London: Central Asian
Research Center, 1974), pp. 7-8.
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conflict with Somalia than it did in the conflict with the
Eritreans to support the Soviet Union and Ethiopia.
C. TEE SOVIZTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE OGADEN DISPUTE
The Horn of Africa is of important strategic value to the
Soviets. It provides them with a staging area for
reconnaissance, a facility for repairs and storage of tactical
surface-to-surface missiles and fuel, and a long range
receiving station.9' Furthermore, Soviet presence in the
Horn of Africa place them in a position to exert control over
the important choke point at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
Finally, the Soviet Union was acutely aware of the strategic
importance this area had for the West as well.
Imperial Russian interests in Ethiopia dates back to the
19th century. As a consequence of their common adherence to
Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the two countries maintained
diplomatic ties. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, as the
Soviets began being more and more interested in Africa as a
Third World ally, they attempted to court Selassie. This was
to no avail, except for an increase in diplomatic ties and a
$100 million credit agreement between the two countries. It
was the United States that had assisted Selassie in obtaining
his position and it was the United States and Western Europe
which largely supplied the Ethiopian army. Additionally,
97Jiri Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban Intervention," p. 356.
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Ethiopia and the United States signed a "special friendship"
agreement in 1953 providing the United States access to the
communications facility at Kagnew station in Eritrea for
twenty-five years. Unhappy with its lack of success in
Ethiopia, the Soviets turned elsewhere in the region in hopes
of increasing their position in the Horn.
1. The Soviet Union and Somalia
Since its independence in 1960, Somalia had been
seeking to develop ties with a number of Western countries for
military aid in order to build up its army to be able to fight
and regain the land they felt belonged to them. However, no
Western country appeared to be interested in Somalia enough to
provide it with the aid it was requesting. Furthermore, none
of the countries supported Somalia's irredentism because it
would inevitably become a point of contention within the
region. "Eager to establish a military foothold in the Horn
and already developing ambitions in the Indian Ocean, the
Soviets capitalized on the best opening they could get.""e
Thus, in 1963, the Soviet Union began equipping and supplying
the Somalia armed forces.
In 1969, the para-military democracy was ousted by a
military coup led by the chief of staff of the army, Siad
Barre. This new revolutionary government was more closely
"9*Paul Henze, Russians and the Horn: Opportunism and the
Long View no. 5 (Marine Del Rey, California: European American
Institute for Security Research, 1983.), p. 7.
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aligned to Soviet ideology. Consequently, Soviet military aid
flowed in to the area more rapidly than previously and
additional Soviet advisors were sent to assist.
-By the early 1970's, Soviet policy objectives were
achieved by relying on the military instrument of policy.
They had obtained access to the Berbera and Mogadishu naval
port facilities and there was a Soviet presence in Somalia.
Soviet support to Somalia was a means of countering U.S.
support to Ethiopia. Additionally, the Soviets were the key
in developing the Somali army. "...[T]he Soviet Union started
having an impact by helping to shape the country's political
institutions and security systems .... While the coup had not
been engineered by the Soviets, the net result had been that
the army they had created was in power."99
2. The Soviets Switch Allegiance and Support Ethiopia
In 1974, the Soviets received another opportunity to
penetrate into Ethiopia. The creation of the Dergue
eventually led to the emergence of a radical extremist named
Mengitsu Haile Mariam. The Dergue, with Mengitsu as leader,
was "...an authoritarian narrowly based military committee
with the ambition to catapult Ethiopia from feudalism to
socialism in a short span of time."10 0 Thus, the Soviets saw
this opportunity as a means of directly countering the United
"99Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence, p. 79.
"
10 0 1bid., pp. 156-157.
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States and the West by supporting the new Marxist-leaning
revolutionary government and possibly obtaining a stronger
strategic foothold in the Horn.
-In December 1976, the Soviets made an arms deal with
Mengitsu for $200 million in arms. In May 1977, the Dergue
terminated its arms agreement with the United States. It is
presumed that the December negotiations led to the termination
of ties between the United States and Ethiopia and this
subsequently led to a second military aid agreement between
Mengitsu and the Soviets. This second agreement was for an
arms aid program for an estimated amount of $500 million."'1
The outbreak of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia,
in the summer of 1977 in the Ogaden desert, forced the Soviets
to decide which country they favored more. With the
termination of U.S.-Ethiopian military ties in May, the
Soviets attempted to use the dispute to their advantage by
influencing a greater portion of the Horn of Africa.
Now playing both sides of the fence, the Soviet Union
began to push harder for negotiated settlements. While
assuring Siad Barre that favorable relations between the
Soviet Union and Somalia would continue, the Soviets continued
supplying Ethiopia with arms. By November 1977, the Somalia
10 1Carol A. Rohel, Anti-Revolutionary Guerilla Struggles
in Africa: Case Studies of Ethiopia and Angola (Carlisle
Barracks Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 13 May 1983), p.
21.
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government, feeling betrayed, expelled the Soviet Union from
its country.
It was at this point that Soviet aid to Ethiopia
increased tremendously. During the initial phase of the
conflict, victory for Somalia seemed imminent. However, two
key factors led to the break-down of the Somalia offensive and
forced them to retreat from the Ogaden region. First, the
Soviets staged one of the largest air and sealifts of
equipment in history. According to an article published in
Air Force Magazine, beginning in November 1977, "...[T]here
were fifty flights in the first six days .... It is estimated
that the Soviet Union sent almost $1 billion of military
equipment to Ethiopia between November and July 1978. "102
The importance of the airlift was not only in the volume but
also in the quickness. "...[T]he Soviet Union was able to get
the first shipments to Ethiopia. These provided a boost in
the morale of the Ethiopian forces during a critical point in
their struggle against the advancing Somali forces." 1 0 3 The
second key factor to the break-down of the Somalia offensive
was the arrival of 15,000 Cuban troops to fight alongside the
Ethiopian forces.
The decision the Soviets made in the mid-1970's to
support Ethiopia was a calculated decision and did not come
102Bonner Day, "Soviet AirJift to Ethiopia," Air Force
Magazine (September 1978): p. 33.
103 Ibid.
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cheaply. The Soviet Union had invested fifteen years of
building a loyal client state in Somalia and poured more than
$285 million in military assistance into the country. 104
Howeveri the Soviets saw several advantages in supporting
Ethiopia: first, Ethiopia possessed a population which was
nine times larger than the population of Somalia; second,
Ethiopia's Gross National Product was approximately eight
times larger; third, Ethiopia possessed greater natural
resources; and fourth, Ethiopia had a greater influence over
the Sub-Saharan region. However, supporting Ethiopia placed
the Soviet Union in yet another difficult position, that of
the Eritrean insurgency.
D. THE SOVIET UNION'S INVOLVZMUNT IN ZRITPEA
In the 1960's, when the Soviets were seeking ties with
Ethiopia, they began supplying the Eritrean rebels with
military aid as a means of countering Western influence
throughout the rest of the region. The Soviets initially saw
tbs. Eritreans as a means of countering the pro-Western Haile
Selassie. However, once Mengitsu took control of Ethiopia,
the Eritreans no longer were of any real importance to the
Soviets. Unlike the MPLA in Angola and Siad Barre's regime in
Somalia, providing the Eritreans with military aid did not
afford the Soviets any sort of leverage in Ethiopia. It
104Paul Henze, Russians and the Horn, p. 20.
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seemed Mengitsu possessed the power in the country and the
Soviets had an ally in him. Indeed, the Eritreans were now
counter-productive to Moscow's new goal of stabilizing a pro-
Soviet government in Addis Ababa.
When the Soviets began voicing support for the new
revolutionary government of Ethiopia, Soviet support to the
Eritrean rebels was surreptitious. However, the Cubans and
the Chinese made no qualms in their support for Eritrean
independence and continued to support the Eritreans. Early in
the conflict, under Mengitsu's rule, the Soviets supported
Cuba's argument that diplomacy was the best solution for the
situation. Soviet support for diplomacy would, however,
quickly change.
In 1977, the Soviets began backing Mengitsu's government
against the Eritreans. Initially the Cubans were not able to
support the Ethiopians. As the conflict progressed in
Somalia, however, with great reluctance1 0 5 the Cubans
eventually began supporting the Soviets' decision to back
Ethiopia in the Eritrean conflict. In a 1989 RAND study, Paul
Henze estimates that $11 billion has been invested in the
Ethiopian armed forces since 1977.106 Support has been in
terms of arms, technical assistance, and training.
10sLike Somalia, the Cubans had been supporting the
Eritreans since the early 1960's. In fact they trained them
in Cuba.
'"Paul Henze, Eritrean Options and Ethiopia's Future
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1989), p. 11.
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Additionally, Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisors have
been sent to oversee and direct the utilization of the
resources the Soviets have made available to the Ethiopian
armed forces.
Cuba's investment has been costly, with little or no
return. Since 1977, the Cubans have continually tried to
persuade the Soviet Union push for negotiated settlements,
however this has been to no avail. Negotiated settlements
would be for naught because there is no way that Mengitsu
would concede independence to Eritrea and lose access to the
Red Sea. Thus, the battle continues to wage in Ethiopia with
the Soviets seemingly losing more and more influence there as
compared to the 1970's.
X. CUBA'S ROLE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
1. Somalia
Prior to 1976, Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa
was minimal. For several years Cuba had military instructors
in Somalia itself training the army which the Soviets had
helped to create. However, unlike the Soviet Union, Cuba
possessed no strategic desire to obtain military facilities in
the Horn, nor did it aspire to obtain economic advantage from
its military and technical assistance in Somalia. Cuba's
support to Somalia was not even done in response to Soviet
request, rather it was by Somali request and in adherence to
Cuba's foreign policy initiatives. Additionally, these two
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countries held similar characteristics which were expressed by
Castro during a visit in 1977:
... because the two countries' views are close on all
current international problems and in defence of the
principles of socialism .... We are both small and poor
countries and we must tackle enormous difficulties; we
want to build many schools, hospitals and universities,
develop agriculture and build factories .... Our natural
resources are meager; they are still to be uncovered and
exploited, but we have revolutionary principles and we
have dignity.20 7
As the Soviets began supporting Ethiopia, the Cubans outwardly
expressed their concern and intimated that the tensions
between the two countries required a diplomatic solution.
Castro believed the best solution would be to form a socialist
federation. However, Somalia's interpretation of this union
and Ethiopia's interpretation were quite different. Mengitsu
proposed an alliance th would make up a "common anti-
imperialist front," while Barre proposed ". .. the linking up of
the two countries together with Djibouti and independent
Eritrea--but only after the Ogaden had joined Somalia..." 108
Castro's view of this federal idea was more in line
with that of Mengitsu and furtherMORE he tried to emphasize
that the issue of borders did not justify impediments to
federalism "since there could be no fundamental differences
between true Marxist-Leninists."' 0 9 The combination of the




Soviets' continued support to Ethiopia and the fact that Barre
felt that Castro did not completely understand the complexity
of the Ogaden conflict left him feeling betrayed. Thus, both
Cuba and the Soviets were forced out of Somalia.
While Cubans were exiting Somalia, it was not the
intent for the Cubans to join forces with the Dergue to fight
in the Ogaden. The Cubans considered this an internal
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and maintained that
negotiated settlements were the only solution. However,
within six months, the Somalis invaded the Ogaden desert, the
Soviets' began supplying Ethiopia with equipment to fight the
offensive, and Cuba was drawn in to a war in which it had no
desire to be involved.
Unlike the conflict in Angola, "IT]he Ethiopian
operation was the result of complete coordination with the
Soviet Union and 12,000 Cuban troops."11 0  Additionally,
whereas in Angola the Cubans were in control of the operation,
in Ethiopia "...Cuba's Expeditionary Forces that spearheaded
the successful offensive against Somalia in February-March
1978 were led by Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, [but] they
were under the overall command of Lieutenant General Vasiliy
Ivanovich Petrov of the USSR."1 1 1
"
1Robert A. Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union," p. 300.
Other sources use figures of 15,000 and 17,000 troops.
"
1 11Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa,"
Communism in Africa, ed., David E. Albright (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1980): p. 155.
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2. Zritrea
During the same period that Somalia invaded the Ogaden
Desert, the Eritrean guerrillas began gaining ground in
northern Ethiopia. This was possible because all of
Mengitsu's forces were involved in the Ogaden conflict freeing
up the Eritrean region. Confronted with a rapidly
deteriorating military predicament, Mengitsu turned to solicit
the Soviet Union and Cuba for an increase in aid and
assistance. The Soviet Union's decision to support Mengitsu
caused tensions to surface between Cuba and the Soviet Union
once again.
Cuba's position on the Eritrean conflict was more
adamant than the previous Somalian conflict. Cuba's position
did not converge with that of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia.
Castro repeatedly refused to directly assist Mengitsu in his
ambition to crush the rebellion militarily. Although Cuba's
foreign policy clearly states that Cuba will not interfere in
matters which are the internal affairs of that country, in
reality Castro was using this as a crutch in refusing to
provide the assistance Mengitsu wanted. Additionally, Cuba
had been supporting the Eritreans for as long as it had been
supporting the MPLA. This situation was more of a dilemma for
the Cubans than the previous conflict.
Early in 1978, the Soviet Union publicly stated that
it would support Mengitsu on the use of military force. On
February 26, 1978, Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael
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Rodriguez announced that "Cuban troops would not be deployed
against the rebels on grounds that Cuban troops had helped the
Eritreans in their fight for self-determination from Ethiopia
[prior to Mengitsu's rule] and that a political solution now
had to be pursued by means of talks between the two
sides...3 1 2  The Soviet Union found itself confronted with
not only Cuban opposition to a military solution but Arab
opposition as well. Thus, realizing that without the Cubans'
willingness to dispatch combat troops, the Soviets could not
successfully pursue a military solution. In June 1978, Moscow
began actively encouraging Mengitsu to seek for negotiated
settlements with the Eritreans.
Although Cuba was able to maintain its position
throughout the rest of the 19-9's, events in the 1980's
compelled Castro to increase Cuban assistance to Ethiopia. By
mid-1986, some 5,000 troops supporting Mengitsu's regime over
the Ogaden remained in Ethiopia. Consequently, "while these
troops were not being used directly against the [EPLF
insurgents], they did free up several thousand Ethiopian
troops for duty in the northern provinces [emphasis
added]."' 1 3  Additionally, Cuban political and diplomatic
support to the Mengitsu regime forced a more realistic
"112ibid.
1 13Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra, p. 92.
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assessment by the Eritreans. They now saw Cuba as part of the
Mengitsu's regime attempt to crush them.
If Cuba had its choice, it probably would not have
become involved in the Ethiopian dilemma. However, as the
Soviets continued to supply Ethiopia, Cuban forces
increasingly were obliged to man the front lines and to
operate the sophisticated Soviet weaponry. Thus, however it
evolved, the Cubans transitioned from providing no assistance
to the Eritrean conflict, to indirectly aiding the Mengitsu
regime, to actually assisting the Mengitsu regime on the front
lines.
F. CURRENT RESULTS OF CUBAN AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE
In the case of Ethiopia, although the Ethiopian army
remained on the offensive until 1988, both of these conflicts
remain unresolved. It is astonishing that since 1977 the
Soviet Union has provided the Ethiopians with vast amounts of
weaponry, thousands of military advisors, and has facilitated
the transfer of still thousands of Cuban combat troops. More
importantly, despite possessing one of Africa's largest armed
forces, approximately 300,000 men, the Ethiopian regime has
yet to defeat the opposition movements outright, or even
substantially weaken them. Nor does it have the economic
capacity or political legitimacy to undermine the popular
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bases of rebel support in areas not firmly controlled by the
government. 14
Beginning in 1988, the Ethiopian army suffered a number of
serious losses at the hands of the rebels. In February 1988,
the EPLF defeated three Ethiopian divisions in Eritrea,
capturing 20,000 troops and driving the remainder south to
Asmara.115 One year later another Ethiopian force of 12,000
troops, including several high ranking officers, was defeated.
This victory forced the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops
from Tigre. It was this incident that set the stage for a
coup attempt to oust Mengitsu in May 1989.
As the conflicts reach their thirteenth year, the Soviet
Union obviously could not meet its cold war objectives of
stabilizing the regime or establishing political control.
Furthermore, with Mikhail Gorbachev's implementation of
PERESTROIKA and GLASNOST, the Soviets no longer have the same
cold war objectives and have now begun pursuing a less
supportive role in the region.
Consequently, the combination of military defeats, a
worsening economy, and Soviet pressure has forced Mengitsu to
make peace overtures. Peace talks were held between the
Eritreans, Soviet representatives, and representatives from
the central government of Ethiopia in September 1989. They
114Edmond J. Keller, "Revolution in State Power," Current
History, 87, no. 529 (May 1988): p. 217.
'"Ibid., p. 231.
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were held in Atlanta, Georgia and mediated by former President
Jimmy Carter. Unlike the Angolan negotiations, there were no
Cuban representatives present. Instead, and coinciding with
these peace talks, the Soviets began withdrawing Cuban troops
and advisors from Ethiopia. This provided initial evidence of
a Soviet desire to disengage from Ethiopia.""'
116Foreign Broadcast Information Service SOV-89-185,
"Moves for Peace in the Horn of Africa Analyzed," (26
September 1989): pp. 20-21. See also Foreign Broadcast
Information Service SOV-89-180, "Ethiopian Peace Talks
Underway in Atlanta," (19 September 1989): pp. 25-28.
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VII. CONCLUSION: COMPARISON OF CUBA' S ROLE IN AFRICA
William A. Pascoe believes that "too much academic time
has been spent in irrelevant debate over whether Cuba acts on
its own, pursuing its own interests in Africa, or whether it
acts at the behest of its patrons in the Kremlin." 117 I do
not believe one can take this matter lightly. Cuba possesses
a military which far exceeds its territorial defense limits
and this military has proven to be efficient abroad (unlike
any other Third World country). It was in the late 1960's and
early 1970's that Castro realized that Cuba could probably
never become a viable economic partner with the Soviet Union
thus, "...for Cuba, political/military consideration have
often proved to be more important in determining foreign
policy than economic needs." 11 8 Cuba's military plays a
significant role in its foreign policy; it has been
strengthened as a powerful Third World force, its mission
abroad is unique and vital for Cuba, and its involvement in
Africa allowed Cuba to emerge as an influential Third World
power. Thus, the mere fact that such a Third World country is
able to achieve this status makes it important to evaluate how
117Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra, p. 94.
".. Jasque Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution,
trans. Deanna Drendel Lebouef (New York: Praeger Publisher,
1978), p. 192.
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it was accomplished and the role it plays in the international
arena.
A. IS CUBA A SURROGATE OF THE SOVIZET UNION?
It is difficult, after doing research on Cuba's foreign
policy, to say in one sweeping statement that Cuba is or is
not a surrogate of the Soviet Union. While there are other
cases that could have been researched, these two case studies
tend to best illustrate that Cuba has sought to act
independently with respect to its foreign policy agenda.
Gavriel D. Ra'anan discusses surrogates in his study, The
Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military
Relations with the Third World, with Particular Emphasis On
Cuban Participation in Africa. Based on his study he defines
Cuba as a surrogate of the Soviet Union. He states that it
does not matter whether Castro acted on his own initiative but
rather a country is a surrogate of the Soviet Union if
"...surrogate forces deployed in the Third World are working
in cooperation with the Soviet Union, enjoy Soviet logistical
support, [if] their efforts are being subsidized by the
Russians, and [if] many of the benefits of their campaigns
accrue to the USSR." 119 Furthermore, he adds that "...the
key element is leverage, be it in the form of military
1 1
'Gavriel D. Ra'anan, The Evolution of the Jcviet Use of
Surrogates in Military Relations with the Third World, with
Particular Emphasis On Cuban Participation in Africa (Santa
Monica, California: RAND Corporation, December 1979), p. 75.
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occupation or reliance on military or economic aid (or any
combination thereof), which the Soviet Union has over the
states acting in its stead.', 120  Consequently, by this
definition, he lumps together Cuba, North Korea, North
Vietnam, and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces all as Soviet
surrogates.
He treats the fact that much of Cuba's initiative in
Africa came directly from Castro as insignificant when this is
probably the one thing that makes Cuba stand out from all of
the other countries aligned to the Soviet Union. This
initiative went on to be a powerful force for Cuba in Latin
America. Without experiencing the successes in implementing
its own foreign policy in Africa, the Soviet Union probably
would not have been as willing to support Cuba in its
endeavors in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Castro's initiative
is the one thing that allows one to ask the question of
surrogacy or autonomy at all.
Jiri Valenta argues that as a result of Cuba's independent
decisions in Africa "Cuba gained the status of a privileged
ally and was able to insist on adjustments in Soviet/Cuban
economic and political relations [emphasis added]." 12 1  He
places great value on Cuba's initiative to send combat troops
into Africa as does David Ronfeldt who describes Cuba as a
120Ibid.
12 1Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance," p. 45.
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suporclient. Ronfeldt defines superclient as, ...far frm
being a weak dependent (it] manages to exploit mutual
dependence and its own resources in order to magnify its
international roles, gain reverse leverage with the
superpower, and at times influence the latter's international
roles .... becoming a superclient, that is, a regional power
closely tied to one superpower, depends largely on having
strong leadership in a centralized regime (an internal
determinant) that succeeds in exploiting the geopolitical
interests of the patron superpower (an external
determinant). 122 Both of these descriptions are better
suited to describe Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union
with reference to Africa; better than either Ra'anan's
definition or the definition provided in the introduction.
B. WAS CUBA A 8URROGATE OF THE SOVIET UNION OR AUTONOMOUS IN
AFRICA?
1. Angola
In the case of Angola, did Cuba act as a surrogate for
the Soviet Union or did Cuba act autonomously? While there
have been many occasions where the Cubans, without a doubt,
acted as a surrogate to the Soviet Union (the Afghanistan
122David Ronfeldt, Superclients and Superpowers,
Cuba:Soviet Union/lran:United States (Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation, April 1978), p. 1.
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situation stands out the most) 1 23 it does not appear to be so
in the case of Angola. While the foreign policy objectives
were different, there was a real convergence of interests
between.the Soviet Union and Cuba which made it easy for the
two countries to cooperate with one another.
Two underlying factors continue to place doubt
regarding Cuba's autonomy in this situation. First, Soviet
military coordination was evident after the first of the year
(January 1976). Second, without Soviet transport support, the
Cubans would not have been able to deploy as quickly and
efficiently to Angola. However, had the Soviets not provided
transportation the results would have probably eventually been
the same but taken longer to accomplish. Herbert Mathews
contends that Cuba did act independently and that the American
administration failed to recognize this. He also emphasizes
that the Cubans would not have terminated its support of the
MPLA, even at the Soviets request. 1 2 '
As stated in the introduction, it usually benefits a
Third World nation, aligned with a superpower, to support the
superpower's foreign policy objectives. However, this does
not mean that their objectives always have to be identical.
L23Even though Afghanistan was a member of the NAM, Cuba
backed the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. What made this
situation even more striking was that at the time of the
invasion, Castro was the leader of the NAM.
124Herbert Mathews, "Angola is Another Move in the Cuban
Revolution," The New York Times, 4 March 1976, p. 31.
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Jorge Dominguez states "Cuba has discretion within Soviet
hegemony in the making of its foreign policy."1 25
Consequently, as Valenta states, the success of any Soviet
entarprise in Angola was dependent on "...the willingness of
Fidel Castro and his colleagues to provide ground forces." 1 2
As a result of the Cubans' decision to deploy regular
combat troops to Angola and successfully assist the MPLA to
win and maintain the government, Cuba attained a degree of
autonomy that most Third World nations are unable to match.
They accomplished this in spite of the economic dependence
they had on the Soviet Union.
Cuba's decision to commit combat troops to the Angolan
situation was an independent decision. While the Soviets were
probably aware of this decision there is no evidence that any
direct or indirect Soviet pressure influenced Cuba's verdict.
In a February 5, 1976 the New York Times cites a Soviet Union
official as saying, "We did not twist their arms. The Cubans
wanted to go .... they are more radical than we are." 127
Thus, in the case of Angola, Cuba's foreign policy objectives
in Angola were considered successful. It seems reasonable to
12 5Jorge Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign
Affairs, 57, no. 1 (Fall 1978): pp. 83-108.
126Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance," p. 45.
127David Binder, "Kissinger Believes Cuba Exports
Revolution," p. 15C.
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conclude that Cuba acted autonomously, carrying through with
its own foreign policy initiatives.
2. Ethiopia
Determining whether or not Cuba was a surrogate or
autonomous in Ethiopia is more difficult. There was no real
convergence of foreign policy objectives or interest between
the Soviet Union and Cuba. Furthermore, the definition of
surrogacy in this thesis emphasizes the concept of influence
and control over another country's foreign policy. As
presented in the case studies, the Soviet Union possessed much
more influence over Cuba's foreign policy in Ethiopia than in
Angola. It can be concluded that in Angola the Soviet Union
assisted Cuba's foreign policy initiatives whereas in Ethiopia
they virtually determined Cuba's foreign policy.
Additionally, the definition refers to a surrogate as
being a substitute. One of the problems the Soviet Union
encountered, both in Angola and in Ethiopia, was its failure
to understand the strength of African nationalism. Cuba, on
the other hand, fought for its independence for nationalistic
ideals similar to those of the African nations. The Soviets
recognized this after Cuba's decision to assist the MPLA, and
realized the necessity of having Cuban combat troops in
Ethiopia. Angola also proved that the U. S. reaction was less
severe with Cuban troops than it would have been with the
equivalent amount of Soviet combat troops. Consequently, the
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Soviets rallied for Cuban support in Ethiopia because the
Soviets knew Cuba's support would enhance the opportunity to
gain a political and strategic foothold in the Horn.
The Soviets recognized the importance of Cuba's
support. This provided Cuba the leverage of initially acting
independently but also in cooperation with the Soviets. As
described in the Ethiopian case study, the lack of
consolidation of the Mengitsu regime, the many defeats at the
hands of the rebels, and the Soviet promise to provide
continuous aid eventually led Cuba to participate more fully
in the conflicts until it found itself completely involved.
Thus, in the case of Ethiopia, Cuba's activity was
heavily Soviet-directed. Politicians are adamant on Cuba's
role as a Soviet surrogate whereas academics argue that Cuba,
spec-.fically in Angola, acted autonomously and that most
politicians were so involved with U.S. troubles they failed to
recognize Cuba's independent actions. In Ethiopia, Cuba was
perceived to possess less autonomy as a result of Cuba's
acquiescence in collaborating closely with the Soviet Union to
preserve the Dergue, deserting both the Somalians and the
Eritreans. However, what seems to prevail as the most
sensible reason of Cuba's transition to a more dependent
surrogate role in Ethiopia was the failure to resolve issues
diplomatically which resulted in the unsuccessful
rapprochement in the region. This, consequently, led Cuba to
reassess the situation and support the Soviet Union and
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Mengitsu's regime in a military solution to an internal
conflict.
93
VIII. PROSPECTS FOR CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Based on the conclusions of the previous section, what are
the prospects for Cuba's foreign policy? Since independence,
one of Cuba's primary foreign policy objectives has been to
obtain international recognition. Its most successful attempt
at this objective, prior to the Cuban revolution, was during
World War II. Since World War II Cuba has sought to
accomplish this goal by embracing the primary foreign policy
objective of the Cuban revolution: supporting national
liberation movements in other Third World nations (i.e.
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador).
However, Cuba's foreign policy gains throughout the 1970's and
1980's are facing inevitable change in the 1990"s. The wave
of democracy washing throughout Eastern Europe and GLASNOST
and PZPZSTROIEA in the Soviet Union has placed Fidel Castro's
thirty-one year old revolution in its worst position since
1959.
A. IHIUDXATE CONCERNS FACING CASTRO
The immediate concerns confronting Castro in preserving
the revolution include: possible break in Cuban-Soviet
relations, severe economic/trade problems, international
isolationism, internal dissident problems, external dissident
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problems, the emergence of the succession crisis, and the loss
of important allies within Latin America.
1. Future Cuban-Soviet Relations
SSoviet-Cuban relations have undergone a number of
crises; however, the current crisis seems to be the most
critical. While the Soviets maintain that relations between
the two countries will continue, the Soviets face such grave
domestic problems that providing Cuba with the same support of
the past is impossible. Initially, "the Soviet Union ha[d]
made it clear that it ha[d] no plans to end or greatly disrupt
its heavily-subsidized trade [and alliance] with Cuba
(amounting to $5-$7 billion dollars per year and $13 million
dollars per day],"12' however, while the Soviets may have
believed this in the beginning of the year, it has been
evident that they are in worse shape than even the United
States imagined. Consequently, beginning in January 1991, the
Soviet Union will implement a new posture cutting
approximately $150 million in subsidies.' 2'
126Howard W. French, "Write Off Castro? The Odds Change,"
The New York Times, 13 May 1990, p. 2E; Larry Rohter, "Castro
Says He'll Resist Changes Like Those Sweeping Soviet Bloc,"
The New York Times, 9 December 1989, p. 9A; and Joseph B.
Treaster, "Other Walls May Fall, But In Fortress Cuba Castro
Stands Firm," The New York Times, 28 January 1990, p. 2E.
229Lee Hockstader, "Cigars Are About the Only Things That
Are Fat in Cuba These Days," The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 13-19 August 1990, p. 18
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Castro has managed to survive past problems when
everyone else thought it to be impossible. Currently, he has
proposed a new plan to renovate Cuba's political system from
the grassroots organization all the way to the party Central
Committee. Additionally, the Cuban Communist Party has
proposed to streamline the national and provincial posts by
cutting back fifty percent and reorganizing the Central
Committee Secretariat.' 30 According to the article published
in Granma, "the reforms are aimed to reduce excessive
paperwork and bureaucracy.. .making them more flexible and
efficient and freeing individuals from time consuming party
business so they could use their experience and skills in
other tasks [specifically the internal problems facing
Cuba].,,131
Although Castro's immediate concern is with the
country's economic survival, he will continue to use the
leverage he has established with the Soviet Union in order to
maintain Cuba's ideology of socialism.
However, Castro has to be wary of the American threat
to his alliance with the Soviet Union. Currently, the Bush
administration has begun to place pressure on the Soviet
Union, linking Soviet relations with Cuba to a healthy Soviet-
American relationship. Secretary of State James Baker
"`"Cuba Aims to Slice Off Party's Fat, " The Miami Herald,
6 October 1990, pp. 1A, 6A.
"131Ibid.
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emphasized that "Soviet behavior toward Cuba and Central
America remains the biggest obstacle to a full, across the
board improvement in relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union."1 32 During 1989, the United States policy
of linking U.S.-Soviet relations with Soviet-Cuban relations
had very little effect on the Soviet's policy towards Cuba.
"Instead a new one-year Soviet-Cuban trade agreement, signed
in April 1990, reportedly increaseld] trade and technical
assistance by 8.7 percent over 1989. Military aid decreased
from 1988 to 1989, but only to $1.2 billion from $1.5 billion.
[Additionally,] Moscow delivered six new MiG-29s to Havana in
1989 to replace Cuba's aging MiG-23s."1 33 However, this aid
is a result of a 1986-1990 Soviet Five-Year Plan. Although
there has not been a significant decrease in Soviet aid thus
far, the reduction of $150 million in subsidies in 1991
illustrates that change is apparent in the coming years. For
successful economic isolation of Cuba the United States will
have to continues placing these sort of pressures on the
Soviet Union.
"132Jacqueline Tillman, "Cuba:The Next Domino to Fall?,"
The Washington Post, 31 December 1989, p. 2C. James Baker
made this statement in November to the Organization of
American States (OAS). Note that the word biggest is the word
chosen by Baker, not one of the biggest. This places an even
greater emphasis on the concern the U.S. has with Soviet
involvement with Cuba and the rest of Central America.
"133Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba's Cloudy Future," Foreign
Affairs, 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990): p. 117.
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As a result of the desire to continue improving
relations with the United States, Mikhail Gorbachev personally
stated that Cuban assistance should cease both to Nicaragua
and El. Salvador and that Soviet support for these two
insurgent groups would cease.
2. Kconomic/Trade Problems and Isolationism
Castro is fully aware that the current changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will probably result in a
negative economic impact on the Cuba. In a speech made to
factory workers in November 1989 he stated, "We do not know
what consequences these phenomena in many socialist countries
will have .... if the socialist states do not resolve their
problems we could have very serious [economic]
difficulties.. .in the months ahead." 134 Since that speech,
Cuba has shifted to more of a wartime economy. There has been
a freeze on social programs and construction of schools,
hospitals, day-care centers, and homes has come to almost a
complete halt. Everyday foodstuffs such as fruits,
vegetables, and bread have also become very difficult to
obtain.
Additionally, Castro faces the growing threat of
economic isolationism. Over the past year the economy has
slowed from a 2.2 percent rate of growth to barely a 1 percent
"134Reuter, "Castro Laments Very Sad Things in Bloc," The
Washington Post, 9 November 1989, p. 65A.
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rate of growth, and prospects for 1991 are worse still."2 5
Whereas in the past Cuba relied heavily on barter trade and
preferential agreements with the Soviet Union and the Soviet
bloc, new terms of trade are emerging. Both the Soviet Union
and the Eastern European nations are relying more and more on
market prices and hard currency for trade, something Cuba
seriously lacks.
In order to curb the impact that Cuba has already
begun to experience with this problem, Castro has been
compelled to explore alternative trading partners. Already
Cuba has turned to Latin America, China, and East Germany for
increased economic and trade assistance. Recently, Cuba has
found a market for its medical exports in countries like
Brazil and Mexico. The problem with Latin America as a
beneficial trading partner is that Latin American countries
lack credit and will end up limiting Cuba's ability to expand
its exports. Instead China is the most likely to give Cuba
the potential for successful export expansion. In December
1989, China and Cuba signed a new agreement, increasing their
previous economic assistance by eleven per cent, totaling $500
million. 136
13SLee Hockstader, "Cigars Are About the Only Things," p.
18.
"131Jose Luis Llovio Menendez, "Will Freedom Gain From
Cuba's Stormy Foreign Relations?," The Wall Street Journal, 5
January 1990, p. 7A.
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3. Internal Dissident Problems
Castro has begun to crack down heavily on opposition
groups and individual dissidents. The first incident was the
banning of two Soviet publications, Moscow News and Sputnik.
In trying to explain to the Cuban public why they had been
banned, an editorial published in the Cuban newspaper, Granma,
accused the two publications of "justifying bourgeois
democracy as the highest form of popular participation... [and
showing a] fascination with the American way of life."137
The second incident was the arrest of three Cuban human rights
monitors. Each of them was the leader of an unofficial group
seeking leeway for peaceful dissent. 138 These two events have
led to increased vocal dissatisfaction among Cubans, primarily
the student population.
4. External Dissident Problems
It appears that the Cuban exiles (mostly located in
Miami) may also become a problem for Cuba internally. The
concern for Castro is that these two groups will link up to
form a more cohesive opposition. Cuba's Vice President,
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, has opened up a dialogue with these
exiles. According to Rodriguez, the exiles proposed that
"13'"The God that Failed Fidel," The New York Times, 7
September 1989, p. 26A.
"13l ibid.
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Fidel Castro step aside and allow a peaceful transition to
democracy to take place in Cuba. As a representative stated:
We all agreed that the era of Castro's Communism has
reached its end, and that we must look for a
Czechoslovakian solution before intransigence imposes a
Romanian solution on us. 13 9
If history is any indication of the future, Castro will not
allow these internal and external problems to continue and
will increase his repression in order to maintain some control
over both external and internal dissidents.
5. The Succossion Crisis
Fidel's brother, Raul, has always been considered to
be Castro's natural successor, but, with the current events in
the Soviet Union this seems doubtful. Castro tried to place
an immediate end to this problem in July 1989 with the trumped
up charges against General Arnaldo Ochoa and three other
senior military officers. Castro had viewed Ochoa as a
possible threat to his brother and publicly placed these four
men on trial, convicted them and executed them.
However, Castro continues to face problems of
succession and is not completely confident of the Soviet
Union's ability to secure Raul's position. With the advent of
all the current changes taking place, Pamela Falk, a Columbia
"13"Cuban Government, Exiles Talk About Replacing Castro,
The Orlando Sentinel, 27 October 1990, p. 8A.
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University professor, believes "the stage is e -t for almost
total change when Castro leaves."140
6. The Lose of Impoztant Allies Within Latin America
-Two of Castro's oldest Latin American allies who
provided support to Castro's revolutionary cause have
disappeared. The U. S. invasion in December 1989 resulted in
the loss of a very valuable ally, Manuel Noriega. Noriega and
Castro had developed a partnership of convenience. Panama
served as a base for Cuban front companies set up to "skirt
the U.S. trade embargo,", 141 and provide drug laundering
facilities. This partnership provided an access for
Panamanian drug trafficking and the ability for Cuba to obtain
hard currency which it so desperately needs. The new
Panamanian government is not likely to continue this
partnership.
Additionally, the defeat of Daniel Ortega and the
Sandinista revolution places Castro's foreign policy
objectives of promoting revolution in a precarious position.
However, Castro has successfully explained this Sandinista
fall from power both internally, to the Cuban population and
externally to other leftist movements: "The Nicaraguan
"
024Mimi Whitefie.d, "Signs Emerge of Succession Crisis in
Castro's Cuba, Experts Report," The Miami Herald, 24 February
1990, p. 24A.
141Mimi Whitefield, "Recent Setbacks Leave Castro the Odd
Man Out," The Miami Herald, 28 February 1990, p. 9A.
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revolution has passed through a tough test and is entering a
new stage of struggle .... There is no doubt that it is a great
setback but it doesn't mean political bankruptcy or demise for
the Sandinista revolution.""12
13. CVBA AMD TMU PUT=R
Will Cuba be able to meet its foreign policy goals in the
1990's and what will be the implications for future bilateral
Soviet-Cuban relations as a result of current global changes?
While Castro's concerns with isolation, economic and trade
difficulties, internal and external dissident problems, loss
of important Latin American allies, and succession problems
are his top priorities, he has still been able to continue
some semblance of an activist foreign policy. A sign of
Cuba's continued activist foreign policy is continuing Cuban
military aid to El Salvadoran rebels. In the recent rebel
offensive Castro claimed that the offensive was necessary in
order to convince the El Salvadoran government to "negotiate
seriously,""3 and he publicly praised the rebels' ability to
continue their fight. Consequently, Castro has been able to
maintain a degree of control over his established foreign
policy objectives while attempting to solve the immediate
concerns facing his country.
142 Ibid.
"23Gillian Gunn, "Time to Test Cuba," The Christian
Science monitor, 29 December 1989, p. 18.
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1. Possible Scenarios for Cuba's Future
The probability of Cuba's foreign policy of the past
carrying over into the 1990's is very low and relies heavily
on whether or not Castro is able to maintain his leadership
position in Cuba. Since the revolution, Castro relied on
ongoing Soviet assistance, which was critical to papering over
Cuban domestic economic failures, and thus to maintaining the
legitimacy of his rule. However, with Soviet "new thinking"
in foreign policy and the collapse of the Soviet economy, the
days are numbered for large-scale Soviet subsidies of Havana.
Castro must tackle pressing economic issues at home in order
to build a domestic base for resuming an activist foreign
policy.
Four scenarios that could emerge in Cuba are: 1)
Castro begins making economic reforms similar to those of the
Soviet Union and opens up talks with the United States; 2)
Castro steps down from the presidency of his own free will,
allowing Cuba to seek a peaceful transition to democracy; 3)
Castro stands firm with his socialist style government and a
coup occurs either forcing him out of power or killing him;
and 4) Castro stands firm with his socialist style government
and no coup deposes him.
2. Probable Outcome of Proposed Scenarios
Seven U.S. Presidents have attempted to topple or
influence Castro's Cuban revolution. President Dwight
104
Eisenhower began with CIA assassination attempts, followed by
John Kennedy's Bay of Pigs invasion. Lyndon Johnson tried
without success to force Cuba out of the inter-American
system. Next, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford covertly
attempted to oust Castro. Jimmy Carter waged his human rights
campaign against Cuba and was subsequently taught a lesson
with the Mariel boat lift incident. Finally, Ronald Reagan's
administration made veiled threats that were never carried
out. Sal Landau has suggested that "...Bush's staff ought to
review the record. Castro excels under adverse
conditions. "144
Of the four scenarios, the most likely scenario is
that Castro will stand firm with his socialist style
government and subsequently be toppled in a military coup.
Castro will probably never voluntarily step down from his
position and he has made it quite clear that he does not have
any intention of joining the Soviet Union and his former
allies in Eastern Europe in embracing multiparty politics or
a free-market economy. A big difference that exists between
what happened in Eastern Europe and Cuba is that "socialism
was not imposed from the outside in Cuba. Its arrival with Mr
Castro's home-grown revolution was not an act of submission to
144Saul Landau, "Cuba: Socialism on one Island, " The
Progressive, 54, no. 6 (June 1990): p. 20.
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a powerful neighbor, but rather a form of defiance of the
United States.'"145
However, given the growing strains within Cuba,
without. Castro's willingness to democratize Cuba and enact
necessary economic reforms, Castro may face a violent counter
revolution led by a fierce military uprising, somewhat similar
to Romania. The U.S. should recognize that Cuban exiles may
join with (if not incite) dissident military officers in Cuba.
However, the United States should also recognize that even if
there is a successful coup, a Cuba without Castro is unlikely
to be like "Batista Cuba."
While this is the most likely of the four scenarios,
Castro should not be underestimated. Many analysts believed
that he would be gone by December 1989, yet he continues to
hold on. Nevertheless several significant events are to occur
in January 1991. In relation to Cuba, the Soviets will sell
oil to at world market prices, demand hard currency in trade,
and require payment of debts. In relation to the Third World,
the Soviets will reduce assistance by 75 percent. Thus, if
Castro can manage to survive the first six to eight months of
1991, his chances of maintaining control of the country will
be increased.
"
34sJoseph B. Treaster, "Other Walls May Fall, " p. 4A.
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If Castro is able to somehow successfully deal with
the current economic crisis, then the world may witness Cuba
gradually achieving its ultimate objective, a foreign policy
which is self-reliant, autonomous, and independent. Such a
scenario, however, is unlikely. Instead, as one observer has
pointed out, "The whole sense is that for the first time,
they're not on the crest of the wave; they're about to be
swamped by it. "14
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